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The purpose of the study was to compare the effects of graphic social comparison
feedback (SCF) with tiered goals under both fixed pay and incentive pay. Graphic SCF that
displays the individual performance of each group member was found to be the most effective
type of graphic feedback in two relatively recent studies (Einarsson, 2016; VanStelle, 2012). The
effectiveness of SCF may be due to the fact that the performances of peers serve as sub-goals for
each individual, essentially setting up individualized ability-based goals. Currently, it is unclear
whether the normative component of SCF contributes to its effectiveness. Rather, similar effects
might occur when individuals are given non-normative tiered goals and provided with private,
individualized feedback. A 2 x 2 factorial design was used with the following four experimental
conditions: (a) goal-setting with fixed pay, (b) goal-setting with incentive pay, (c) SCF with
fixed pay, and (d) SCF with incentive pay. Results were based on 64 undergraduate student
participants who were randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Each attended a
covariate session and three experimental sessions. Sessions were 45 minutes. Participants
performed a computerized task that simulates the job of a data entry clerk. The main dependent
variable was the number of correctly completed records. A two-factor ANCOVA was used to
analyze the differences among the groups. Statistically significant differences were found on

factor A and B. The incentive pay conditions performed significantly better than the fixed pay
conditions and the SCF conditions performed significantly better than the goal-setting
conditions. No significant interaction effect was detected. This study contributed to the feedback
literature by comparing the effects of two types of graphic feedback: graphic feedback based on
normative standards and graphic feedback based on goals. The component analysis showed that
these two types of feedback, although structurally similar, can affect performance differently. In
turn, this suggests that the underlying behavioral mechanisms of the two types of feedback are
different.
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1

INTRODUCTION
Feedback is the most popular intervention in organizational behavior management
(OBM). In three decades between 1977 and 2009, 65% - 71% of studies published in the Journal
of Organizational Behavior Management (JOBM) included feedback as an intervention, alone or
in combination with other variables (Balcazar, Shupert, Daniels, Mawhinney, & Hopkins, 1989;
Nolan, Jarema, & Austin, 1999; VanStelle et al., 2012). Part of its popularity may stem from the
fact that feedback, which can significantly improve performance, is not a costly performance
improvement solution in comparison to other interventions (Prue & Fairbank, 1981). Also,
because the process of collecting data on performance is the foundation of most performance
improvement interventions, it does not require much additional effort to make those data
available to employees.
Feedback has been, and continues to be, defined in many different ways (Alvero,
Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Houmanfar, 2013). Prue and Fairbank (1981), in one of the first
reviews of feedback in OBM, defined it as providing information to an individual or group about
performance as it relates to either quality or quantity. Sulzer-Azaroff and Mayer (1991) defined
it as information communicated back to the performer after a particular performance. More
recently, Daniels and Bailey (2014) defined feedback as “information about performance that
allows a person to change his/her behavior” (p. 171). Regardless of the formal definition, the
purpose of feedback is to refine and improve performance by giving workers information about
past performance. This purpose corresponds with the meaning of the word “feedback”, as it was
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originally used in engineering and cybernetics for machine-based systems (Duncan &
Bruwelheide, 1985-1986; Peterson, 1982).
Over the years, many behavior analysts have discussed the possible behavioral functions
that feedback might serve (Alvero et al., 2001; Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1985-1986; Duncan
& Bruwelheide, 1985-1986; Ford, 1980; Mangiapanello & Hemmes, 2015; Peterson, 1982; Prue
& Fairbank, 1981). Feedback has been conceptualized as a conditioned reinforcer (e.g., Komaki,
Barwick, & Scott, 1978; Panyan, Boozer & Morris, 1970) a discriminative stimulus (e.g.,
Balcazar et al., 1985-1986; Daniels & Bailey, 2014), rule-governed analogies of a conditioned
reinforcer and a discriminative stimulus (e.g., Agnew & Redmon, 1992; Malott, 1993), and a
motivating operation (e.g., Agnew, 1998; Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1985-1986). In general
critiques of feedback, authors have recognized that feedback, as a physical stimulus, could have
some or all of the aforementioned behavioral functions depending upon the situation (e.g.,
Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1985-1986; Mangiapanello & Hemmes, 2015; Peterson, 1982; Prue &
Fairbank, 1981).
There are a number of reasons why it is difficult to identify the behavioral function of
feedback. First and foremost, feedback applications differ considerably from one setting to
another, which makes comparisons and general conclusions problematic. Additionally, in
ongoing management systems (a) feedback both precedes and follows the targeted performance;
(b) organizational contingencies that may influence the effects of feedback are complex and
often not specified; and (c) the conditioning histories of employees, particularly within the
organization, are not known. Today, as in the past, analyses of the behavioral function of
feedback remain highly speculative, even in specific situations.
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Despite difficulties in identifying the behavioral function of feedback, OBM
professionals have attempted to determine the features of feedback that make it effective. Ford
(1980) identified and classified feedback applications along several dimensions in order to
systematize and thus lead to greater understanding of “…this cumbersome and disorganized
aggregation of methods and procedures” (p. 183). Prue and Fairbank expanded the classification
system in their 1981 review. Subsequent to that, Balcazar et al. (1985-1986) evaluated the
effectiveness of feedback applications by dimension. The review, which included applied studies
published in four major journals over a 10-year period, reported the percentage of applications
with particular dimensions that had consistent, mixed, or no effects on performance. Alvero et al.
(2001) replicated this review for applied studies published in the same journals between 1985
and 1998.
These structural reviews have been helpful in identifying some of the important
dimensions of feedback applications and have helped guide researchers and practitioners.
However, both Balcazar et al. (1985-1986) and Alvero et al. (2001) found that most feedback
applications were used along with other independent variables. This is understandable, especially
in organizational settings where it is vital to solve problems as quickly as possible, but this
practice limits the extent to which intervention effects can be attributed to feedback and,
therefore, to a specific feedback dimension. By aggregating feedback dimensions from different
studies into the same feedback categories, the structural reviews may end up attributing positive
effects to the feedback dimension, although the actual effects may have been due to other
variables. Additionally, when VanStelle (2012) reexamined the studies included in Alvero et al.,
she found that 84% of the feedback-alone studies used multiple types of feedback. Again, in
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structural reviews, positive effects may be erroneously attributed to one feedback dimension
when, in fact, they were due to other dimensions or to the particular combination of dimensions.
The above problems are illustrated by graphic feedback, one of the categories in Balcazar
et al. (1985-1986) and Alvero et al. (2001) for how feedback is presented. This category includes
feedback applications with different content dimensions (i.e., performance information about
individuals, groups, or both), privacy dimensions (i.e., performance information given privately
or publicly to performers), and frequency dimensions (i.e., performance information provided
daily, weekly, or monthly). General conclusions about the effectiveness of graphic feedback in
comparison to other ways to present feedback (i.e., vocally, written, or mechanically) are, thus,
based on graphic feedback applications that differ along several other dimensions. Yet,
experimental component analyses have shown that some of these other dimensions affect
performance very differently when graphic feedback is used (Einarsson, 2016; Goltz, Citera,
Jensen, Favero, & Komaki, 1989; Ludwig, Geller, & Clarke, 2010; Newby & Robinson, 1983;
So, Lee, & Oah, 2013; Vanstelle, 2012). For example, recently, VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson
(2016) found that workers performed significantly better when they received some type of
graphic social comparison feedback along with graphic individual feedback in comparison to
those who received only graphic individual feedback. Ultimately, only systematic experimental
comparisons like those referenced above can determine the relative effectiveness of various
feedback dimensions.
Social Comparison Feedback
Social comparison feedback is one of the feedback dimensions that Balcazar et al. (19851986) and Alvero et al. (2001) included in the feedback content category. Feedback content
refers to the type of information provided to the performer (i.e., individual, group, individual and
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group, etc.). “Social comparison feedback” has been broadly defined as a display of an
individual’s or group’s performance in comparison to the performance of other individuals or
groups (Williams & Geller, 2000).
The current study will examine one type of social comparison feedback, the graphic
display of an individual’s performance along with the individual performance of peers. A few
different names have been used for this feedback procedure. It has been called public feedback
(Stephens & Ludwig, 2005), public individualized feedback (Ludwig & Geller, 2000; Ludwig et
al., 2010), normative feedback (Bateman & Ludwig, 2004), and public normative feedback
(Camden, Price, & Ludwig, 2011). Because this is the only type of social comparison feedback
that will be examined in the current study, it will be referred to simply as social comparison
feedback (SCF), and the literature review will be restricted to this type of SCF.
Social comparison feedback has been used in OBM interventions for over 45 years to
improve performance in various settings, such as human service agencies (Greene, Willis, Levy,
& Bailey, 1978; Kreitner, Reif, & Morris, 1977; Panyan et al., 1970; Welsch, Ludwig, Radiker,
& Krapfl, 1973), pizza delivery stores (Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, & Geller, 2002; Ludwig et al.,
2010), retail stores (Camden et al., 2011; Newby & Robinson, 1983), a manufacturing firm
(Wikoff, Anderson, & Crowell, 1982), a real-estate brokerage (Anderson, Crowell, Sucec,
Gilligan, & Wikoff, 1983), a bar (Anderson, Crowell, Hantula, & Siroky, 1988) a hotel
(Anderson, Crowell, Sponsel, Clarke, & Brence, 1983), a distribution warehouse (Bateman &
Ludwig, 2004), a swim club (McKenzie & Rushall, 1974), and a hospital (Stephens & Ludwig,
2005). Despite the use of SCF over the years, studies examining its relative effectiveness in
comparison to other feedback applications are rare. A review of the literature revealed only five
studies that have compared SCF to other types of feedback interventions.
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Two studies compared publicly posted SCF with publicly posted group performance
feedback (Ludwig et al., 2010; Newby & Robinson, 1983) and one compared privately presented
SCF with privately presented group performance feedback (Goltz et al., 1989). All three found
SCF to be more effective than displays of group performance. Although the results of these
studies are informative, it is not clear whether they are due to the display of the normative data of
peers or simply to the display of the individual’s own performance (which is part of the
normative display). The remaining two studies, VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016),
compared SCF to other individual feedback applications, controlling for this potential confound.
VanStelle (2012), in a laboratory simulation, compared the effects of three types of
graphic feedback when individuals received fixed pay, using a between-group design with 54
participants. Each participant completed five 30-minute sessions. The task was a computerized
medical data entry task and the primary dependent variable was the number of correctly entered
medical records. Participants received graphic feedback that displayed (a) only their own
performance, (b) their own performance along with the group’s average performance, or (c) their
own performance along with the performance of everyone else in the group, identified by name.
Across the five sessions, performance increased by 14%, 21%, and 31%, respectively, for the
three groups identified above. An ordered treatment monotone ANCOVA confirmed significant
performance differences (p < 0.05) between the groups in the predicted order: Participants who
received the display depicting the individual performance of their peers along with their own
performance performed the best, followed by those who received the display depicting the
group’s average performance along with their own performance, followed by those who received
the display depicting only their own performance.
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In an extension of VanStelle’s (2012) study, Einarsson (2016) compared the effectiveness
of graphic individual feedback and graphic SCF when individuals received piece-rate pay, using
a between-group design with 80 participants. Each participant completed five 45-minute
sessions. Einarsson used the same medical data entry task as VanStelle and the same primary
dependent variable, the number of correctly completed medical records. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the following three groups: (a) no feedback, (b) graphic individual
feedback, or (c) graphic SCF. Across the five sessions, performance increased by 6.6%, 21.2%,
and 23.7%, respectively. An ordered treatment monotone ANCOVA confirmed significant
performance differences (p < 0.01) in the predicted order: Participants who received graphic SCF
performed the best, followed by those who received graphic individual feedback, followed by
those who did not receive feedback.
The results of Einarsson’s (2016) study are consistent with VanStelle’s (2012) results and
extend them to performance when individuals are paid monetary incentives. The data from the
two studies indicate that both graphic individual feedback and SCF improve performance under
hourly and incentive pay conditions. Together, they also indicate that graphic SCF results in
higher levels of performance than either graphic individual feedback (Einarsson, 2016;
VanStelle, 2012) or graphic individual feedback displayed along with the group’s average
performance (VanStelle, 2012). It should be noted, however, that in Einarsson’s study, the
incentive pay appears to have attenuated the performance differences between the SCF and
individual feedback groups. In VanStelle’s study, when participants received fixed pay, the SCF
group performed 18% better than the individual feedback group, whereas in Einarsson’s study,
the SCF group performed only 7% better.
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Johnson’s (2013) component analysis of objective and evaluative feedback may serve a
crucial role in understanding why SCF resulted in better performance than the other types of
feedback examined by VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016). Objective feedback can be
defined as measureable, factual data about performance that does not indicate and/or is not
related to how well an individual is performing (Einarsson, 2016). For example, a manager could
tell an employee, “you produced 20 parts yesterday” or “your total sales was $1,000 yesterday”.
Historically, this type of feedback has been referred to as “knowledge of results” (Annett, 1969;
Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Evaluative feedback, on the other hand, indicates how well the
individual is performing in comparison to some metric, such as a performance standard, a goal,
or the performance of others, and is usually accompanied by praise or criticism (Einarsson,
2016). For example, a manager could tell an employee, “you performed above average
yesterday, great!” or “you were one of our top salespeople yesterday, keep it up!”.
It should be noted that some authors have emphasized that in order for information to
qualify as feedback, it must contain sufficient information to enable performers to adjust or
improve their performance (Brethower, 1972; Goodman, Wood, & Hendrickx, 2004; Rummler
& Brache, 1995). Others, however, have not restricted the definition of feedback to its effects on
subsequent performance. For example, the definitions by Sulzer-Azaroff and Mayer (1991) and
Prue and Fairbank (1981) presented earlier state only that feedback is information given to the
performer about past performance. If one adopts the perspective that feedback must enable
performers to improve their performance, it could be argued that neither objective feedback nor
some forms of evaluative feedback are, in fact, “feedback”. With respect to objective feedback as
defined above, informing performers that they produced 20 parts yesterday does not tell
performers what they need to do in order to produce more parts in the future. Similarly,

9
informing performers that they performed above average, average, or below average—evaluative
feedback as defined above—does not tell performers what they need to do in order to perform
better in the future either. Yet, both types of feedback have improved performance in many,
albeit certainly not all, laboratory and applied studies (Crowell et al., 1988; Gaetani, Hoxeng, &
Austin, 1985; Parsons, 1974). The factors that influence the effectiveness of different types of
feedback, such as the complexity of the task and the performer’s level of expertise, are not, as
yet, known. Regardless, individuals who have reviewed the effects of feedback have repeatedly
maintained that the consistency and size of the effects depend, in part, on the extent to which it
permits the performer to assess his or her own performance (Annett, 1969; Ilgen et al., 1979;
Kopelman, 1986; Prue & Fairbank, 1981). Johnson (2013), however, only recently provided a
clear demonstration of the relative effects of objective, evaluative, and combined objective and
evaluative feedback.
Johnson’s (2013) study, conducted in the laboratory, was a between-group study with the
following four conditions: (a) no feedback, (b) objective feedback, (c) evaluative feedback, and
(d) combined objective and evaluative feedback. Using the performance of participants in the no
feedback group as the control, Johnson found that performance improved by 17% when
participants received either objective or evaluative feedback, but improved by 30% when
participants received both objective and evaluative feedback.
All of the feedback conditions in VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016) provided the
same objective feedback to performers (i.e., how many medical records they had correctly
completed). However, the conditions varied greatly with respect to the amount of evaluative
feedback that was available. In VanStelle, the group’s average performance provided a metric
against which performers could assess their performance and is probably why participants in that
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condition outperformed participants who received feedback only on their own performance.
Social comparison feedback provides additional metrics: It sets the boundaries for high and low
performance and displays the relative standing of the performer within the group. This additional
evaluative information probably explains why both VanStelle’s and Einarsson’s SCF participants
performed better than those who were given only individual feedback (Einarsson, 2016;
VanStelle, 2012) and, in addition, why VanStelle’s SCF participants performed better than those
who were given the group’s average performance.
Based on analyses by Guerin (1993, 1994) and McGinnies (1970), Einarsson (2016)
speculated that the evaluative ranking information provided by SCF affects performance because
individuals typically have an extensive history in which performing well in a group is reinforced
and performing poorly is punished. Further, in competitive group and team situations, often only
those that excel are rewarded. In Olympic sports, for example, only the three top performers
receive medals and in business and industry, only the top employees become the employee-ofthe-month. Peers typically provide differential social consequences for good and bad
performance in groups and teams as well: Good performers are lauded and rewarded by peers;
poor performers are criticized and may even be ridiculed and ostracized. This history of
reinforcement is likely to generalize to new settings, making ranks closer to the top reinforcing
and ranks closer to the bottom aversive.
Guerin (1993, 1994) argued that many people have a stronger history of being punished
or criticized for their performance rather than being rewarded for it. According to this
perspective, then, the avoidance of low or comparatively lower rankings and anticipated aversive
consequences may primarily control behavior, particularly when relative rankings are known and
distributed to all group members.
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Einarsson (2016) also suggested that with SCF, the individual performances of the other
performers (and their rankings) might, essentially, function as multiple sub-goals, establishing
individualized, achievable goals for each performer. For example, the eighth ranked performer
may need to increase his or her performance by 200 widgets to match the performance of the top
performer, which might not be achievable. However, a more incremental increase in
performance is attainable. If the performer produces 15 more widgets and advances from his or
her rank from eighth to seventh, then the sixth rank may be within an attainable range. That is,
each successively higher rank could serve as a sub-goal, evoking behavior that progresses the
individual toward that sub-goal, with progression to the top and/or avoidance of lower rankings
serving as generalized reinforcers.
If, as speculated earlier, a long history of differential consequences based on relative
group rankings has made low ranks aversive and high ranks reinforcing, then the difference
between a currently held rank and superior ranks would be likely to function as a reflexive
motivating operation (Michael, 2004, 2007). As a reflexive motivating operation, the difference
between the current rank and the superior rank would make a decrease in the difference
reinforcing and evoke behaviors that would decrease the difference. The performance of top
performers could also be controlled by positive and/or aversive contingencies relating to past
consequences. Specifically, being at the top or close to the top could serve as a reinforcer, with
the loss or potential loss of one of the top spots functioning as a direct or verbally-mediated
negative reinforcer, sustaining high levels of performance. Given the above analysis of SCF in
terms of goals and the main purpose of the current study, which is to compare the relative effects
of SCF and multiple tiered goals (with feedback), a behavioral analysis of goals will be
considered next.
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Goal-setting
Although not as popular as feedback, goal-setting has also been shown to be an effective
way to increase performance. It has been used as a performance management procedure for
about 100 years, and more than 1,000 studies have examined its effectiveness (Bryan & Harter,
1897; Locke, 1968; Locke & Latham, 2013; Roose & Williams, 2018; Taylor, 1911). Within
OBM, 20% to 30% of the research studies published in JOBM between 1977 and 2009 used
goal-setting as an independent variable (Balcazar et al., 1989; Nolan et al., 1999; VanStelle et al.,
2012). VanStelle et al. (2012), in the most recent review of articles published in JOBM, found
that it was the fourth most popular intervention, after feedback, antecedents, and training, during
1998 – 2009. Unfortunately, like feedback, goals are rarely implemented alone, which makes a
specific analysis of the behavioral function of goals difficult. Despite this, the possible
behavioral functions of goals, again like feedback, have been discussed for years.
Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984) proposed that goals can function as discriminative
stimuli when they are correlated with reinforcement for goal-directed behavior. As such, they
would directly evoke goal-directed behavior when presented. Once evoked, goal-directed
behavior is maintained by rewards for goal attainment, such as praise, preferred assignments,
extra time-off, and monetary incentives. Then, after repeatedly being paired with reinforcers,
goal attainment can become a conditioned reinforcer. Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff further
proposed that the goal itself could become a conditioned reinforcer for goal-directed behavior
when goal attainment is paired with rewards. However, this part of the analysis is problematic,
because the goal necessarily has to come before the goal-directed behavior, not after it, in order
to evoke it. The goal itself, however, might reinforce behaviors that precede it, such as reading a

13
memo from management about what the goal is or looking at a chart or graph on the wall that
visually depicts the goal.
Agnew (1998) discussed goals in terms of motivating operations (Michael, 2004, 2007),
proposing that goals increase the reinforcing value of consequences associated with goal-directed
behavior and directly evoke goal-directed behavior because that behavior has been followed by
those consequences in the past. Similar to Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984), Agnew also
maintained that goals could have different behavioral functions in different settings and could
also have multiple functions. That is, a goal could function as a discriminative stimulus, a
motivating operation, and/or a conditioned reinforcer.
According to a molecular perspective, however, in order to function as a direct-acting
discriminative stimulus or conditioned reinforcer, a goal would have to evoke or follow a
behavior immediately (Malott, 1993; Michael, 2004, 2007). In most work settings, goals are
presented too far before or after behavior to meet this requirement. Thus, goals have also been
conceptualized as rules that specify the relation between certain behaviors and consequences
(Ludwig & Geller, 2000).
Blakely and Schlinger’s (1987) analysis of rule-governed behavior provides one account
of how goals might affect behavior as rules. According to this analysis, rules, which they refer to
as contingency-specifying stimuli in order to distinguish them from discriminative stimuli, alter
the function of other stimuli in the environment. With respect to goals, for example, the
supervisor’s statement that a goal now exists and goal attainment will be rewarded (i.e., the rule)
could change the function of other goal-related stimuli (e.g., the sight of a written goal or a goal
line on a graph) from neutral stimuli to discriminative stimuli or motivating operations. The
goal-related stimuli, when presented, would then evoke behavior immediately. In addition,
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because the supervisor indicated that goal attainment would be rewarded, goal attainment itself
could become a conditioned reinforcer.
Malott’s (1993) analysis of rule-governed behavior offers an alternative explanation of
how goals might affect behavior as rules. In his account, the goal would be likely to evoke a selfstated rule, such as “If I don’t meet the goal, I will be criticized by my supervisor”. The goal
statement then functions as a conditioned motivating operation (Michael, 2004, 2007),
establishing noncompliance (i.e., taking a break from work or working slowly) as a learned
aversive condition. Goal-directed behavior is then evoked and reinforced by an immediate
decrease in the aversiveness created by noncompliance with the rule. Each instance of the
behavior would decrease the aversiveness further. Noncompliance with subsequent selfstatements of the rule would continue to evoke goal-directed behavior until the goal was met.
O’Hora and Maglieri (2006) provided a third verbally-mediated analysis of goal-setting,
using relational frame theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) as its foundation. From
this perspective, goal-statements establish feedback as reinforcement for goal-directed behavior
when the behavior decreases the discrepancy between the individual’s current performance and
the goal. For example, assume that a goal is set at 100 widgets per hour. At the beginning of the
hour, the goal is likely to evoke a self-statement such as, “The goal is 100 widgets and I have not
completed any”. If, after 15 minutes, the worker receives feedback indicating that he has made
20 widgets, the feedback evokes another self-statement, i.e., “I have made 20 widgets”, and
functions as “derived” reinforcement because it indicates that the discrepancy between his
performance and the goal has decreased. Similarly, if, after 30 minutes, the worker receives
feedback indicating that he has made 50 widgets, the feedback will again evoke a self-statement
about the number of widgets he has made and function as reinforcement because the difference
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between the worker’s current performance and goal has once again decreased. This iterative
process continues until the goal is met. Additionally, according to this perspective, the
reinforcement for meeting the goal also reinforces the relational responding in terms of the
discrepancy (i.e., responding that is in accord with the “less than” relation between current
performance and the goal). Thus, if goal attainment is not reinforced, the derived reinforcing
effects of feedback will abate, decreasing future goal-directed behavior.
The above analyses by Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984), Agnew (1998), and Blakely
and Schlinger (1987) emphasize the goal (or goal statement) as the primary controlling variable
of goal-directed behavior. However, the latter two (Malott, 1993; O’Hora & Maglieri, 2006)
suggest that the difference between the goal and the individual’s current performance is the
critical determinant of goal-directed behavior, not simply the goal (or goal statement) itself. That
is, these analyses emphasize the importance of both the goal and the individual’s current level of
performance equally. Although recognizing that goals may function differently in different
settings, these latter analyses are supported by research that has consistently shown that goals do
not effectively control behavior in the absence of feedback (Amigo, Smith, & Ludwig, 2008;
Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Erez, 1977; Locke & Latham, 1984, 1990; Ralis & O’Brien, 1987).
Even though the studies above suggest that the discrepancy between the individual’s
current performance and the goal is the critical determinant of goal-directed behavior, if the
discrepancy is too large, goal-directed behavior may not be evoked. Traditional goal-setting
theorists as well as behavior analysts have consistently stressed that a goal must be achievable in
order to affect performance (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984; Locke &
Latham, 2007).
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Goal-setting interventions differ considerably with respect to how challenging the goal is
(Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984). Daniels and Bailey (2014) pointed
out that it can be hard to set a goal that is challenging, yet also achievable. It can be especially
difficult on a group level because performances can vary greatly among employees.
Unfortunately, OBM researchers have yet to empirically determine what “a challenging, but
achievable goal” is. And, while traditional goal-setting theorists have defined challenging, but
achievable goals as those that 20% to 50% of individuals can achieve (Fasteas & Hirst, 1992;
Jeffrey, Schulz, & Webb, 2012; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989), studies have not compared the
relative effectiveness of goals that fall within that range. Further, it should be noted that if these
traditional definitions are used to set goals, 50%-80% of performers would not be able to achieve
the goal, which makes their designation as “achievable” questionable.
The most effective way to set goals is still being debated (Locke & Latham, 2013).
Daniels and Bailey (2014) caution that a common mistake is to make goals too difficult to
achieve, and urge that it is better to err on the side of making a goal too easy rather than too hard.
On the other end of this spectrum are stretch goals. Stretch goals are goals that are deliberately
intended to be set at a performance level that roughly only 10% of employees will be able to
reach (Daniels, 2009; Jeffrey et al., 2012). The purpose of stretch goals is to motivate employees
to increase performance to levels that they may not have believed possible before being given the
goal.
Stretch goals have mostly been popularized by the success credited to them by a few
notable companies (Kerr & Landauer, 2004; Kerr & LePelley, 2013). The positive effects of
stretch goals, however, are based largely on anecdotal, uncontrolled reports (Sitkin, See, Miller,
Lawless, & Carton, 2011) and are countered by experimental evidence indicating that stretch
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goals are actually detrimental to performance (Chow, Lindquist, & Wu, 2001; Fisher, Peffer, &
Sprinkle, 2003). Conceptually, these latter data are in line with the analyses presented earlier. If
goal attainment is the performance that is rewarded and praised, then a stretch goal is unlikely to
create new opportunities for managers to praise and reward performance. Accordingly, if the
stretch goal evokes new or additional responses by employees, most responses will not be
reinforced and are likely to extinguish (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984;
O’Hora & Maglieri, 2006). Further, for the 90% of employees that never reach the goal, a
constant sign of failure and underperformance is likely to have the opposite effect of what the
stretch goal intended and be detrimental to employee performance (Daniels & Bailey, 2014;
Locke & Latham, 1984). Locke and Latham, when discussing the adverse effects of setting
unreachable goals, stated that:
Nothing breeds success like success. Conversely, nothing causes feelings of despair like
perpetual failure. A primary purpose of goal-setting is to increase the motivation level of
the individual. But goal-setting can have precisely the opposite effect if it produces a
yardstick that constantly makes the individual inadequate. (p. 39)
Tiered goals are one solution to the problem of setting achievable yet challenging goals
for employees. Tiered goals are multiple concurrently available goals set at different intervals of
performance. Tiered goals help to make sure that most, if not all, employees have a goal within
their reach. They also make it possible to deliver differential positive consequences at each goal
level. If goal achievement is consequated correctly, meeting successively higher tiered goals
should increase the amount of praise and rewards received by employees, which in turn, should
increase performance to even higher levels.
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Daniels (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Daniels & Rosen, 1982) and Abernathy (1996, 2013)
are long-time advocates of performance management systems that are based, in part, on tiered
goals. On a measurement tool that Daniels and Abernathy call the Performance Matrix or
Performance Scorecard, five to seven target behaviors or results for a specific job are identified
and weighted according to organizational priorities. Baseline performance measures are then
determined and up to ten sub-goals covering a wide range of performance are listed for each
behavior or result. The top two goals are often used to specify performance that is considered to
be “above goal” or, in other words, overachievement. Differential consequences are then
provided for different levels of performance.
Only two studies have attempted to examine the effects of tiered goals on performance
(Sundberg, 2015; Urschel, 2015). Urschel compared the effects of tiered goals with the effects of
a moderately difficult goal and a difficult goal on performance when individuals received bonus
pay for goal achievement. The study was a between-group study conducted in the laboratory.
The experimental task was a computerized data entry task that simulated the job of a medical
data entry clerk, the same task that was used in the current study. Participants in all three groups
received a $4.00 base pay for each of the five 45-minute sessions they attended. Participants in
tiered goal group were given three goals simultaneously and could earn an additional $1.00 for
meeting the easy goal, $2.00 for meeting the moderate goal, or $3.00 for meeting the difficult
goal. Participants in the moderate goal group could earn an additional $2.00 for meeting their
assigned goal and those in the difficult goal group could earn an additional $3.00 for meeting
their goal. The moderate and difficult goals in the latter two conditions were the same as the
moderate and difficult goals in the tiered goal condition. No significant differences were found
between the three groups. Unfortunately, however, her results were inconclusive because the
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goals were too easy for participants: 66% met or exceeded the difficult goal in the first session
and 84% met or exceeded the difficult goal in the last session. As stated by Urschel, “Rather than
easy, moderate, and difficult, the goals in the current study might be more appropriately labeled
extremely easy, very easy, and easy” (p. 46).
Sundberg (2015), also in a laboratory study, investigated the effects of four different pay
systems on performance when individuals were given the same five tiered goals along with
graphic performance feedback, using a between-group design with 66 participants. Each
participant completed five 45-minute sessions. The experimental task was a medical data entry
task and the dependent variable was the number of correctly completed medical records.
Participants in one group were paid a fixed amount per session. Participants in a second group
received base pay and a per-piece incentive for each correctly completed record. Participants in a
third group received base pay and a per-piece incentive that increased when they met each
successively higher goal. Participants in the fourth group received base pay and bonus pay
which, again, increased when they met each successively higher goal. No statistically significant
performance differences were found between any of the groups.
The failure to find performance differences between the incentive groups and the fixed
pay group is particularly interesting because of the large body of literature that shows that
incentive pay typically produces significantly higher levels of performance than fixed pay
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Condly, Clark, & Stolovitch, 2003; Garbers & Konradt, 2014;
Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003). Sundberg’s (2015) results
may mean that tiered goals and incentives result in similar levels of performance when graphic
feedback is given to workers. If that is the case, it would have very important implications for
organizations. On the other hand, all of Sundberg’s incentive groups performed better than the
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fixed pay group and thus it is possible that there were true differences between the means that,
for some unknown reason, were not detected in the study. Sundberg speculated that failure to
find differences between the groups may have been due to one of the following four reasons: (a)
the sample size was too small; (b) the incentive and bonus payouts were not large enough; (c) the
45-minute work sessions were not long enough; and/or (d) the extra course credit that most
participants received was the primary controlling variable of their performance, not the putative
independent variables. Given the preceding, additional research is warranted to determine
whether tiered goals and monetary incentives have similar effects on performance.
Social Comparison Feedback and Tiered Goals
Both SCF and tiered goals (with feedback) may positively affect performance by
establishing individualized, ability-based sub-goals for each individual. Thus, the behavioral
mechanisms underlying the two interventions may be the same or, at least, similar. However,
with SCF, the performances of peers serve as the sub-goals, which introduces a normative
component that is not present with tiered goals. Normative feedback may enhance performance
by increasing performer perception that the “goals” are attainable in contrast to tiered goals that
may be perceived as arbitrary. That is, in the past, when given goals based on the performance of
peers, performers may have been more successful in meeting them than when given other types
of goals; thus peer-based goals, as antecedents, may exert more control over goal-directed
behavior than other types of goals. On the other hand, tiered goals may have an advantage over
SCF in that their use could avoid the potential aversiveness and punishing effects that may be
associated with SCF; effects that are discussed below.
According to Camden et al. (2011), SCF is effective because it “informs employees of
their performance levels, holds them publically accountable, allows employees to compare
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performance with their peers... and may introduce a measure of competition with their peers” (p.
141). However, as suggested earlier, the public accountability and peer comparison may result in
the aversive control of performance due to historical contingencies that are likely to have
emphasized peer and supervisory criticism for poor performance rather than social approval and
praise for good performance (Guerin, 1993, 1994). Further, low rankings or large discrepancies
between the performance of individuals and their peers could serve to directly or indirectly
punish performance and elicit negative emotional reactions. Finally, although competitiveness is
not always problematic, such displays could generate detrimental, rather than positive, forms of
competition (Buskist & Morgan, 1988; Prue & Fairbank, 1981). Concern for the potential
aversiveness and punishing effects of the public display of individual performance has led some
individuals to develop “rules of thumb” for the delivery of feedback and praise, such as
“Individual feedback should be given privately; group feedback is most often posted publicly”
(Daniels & Bailey, 2014, p. 165), and “Praise publicly—punish privately” (Prue & Fairbank,
1981, p. 4).
Despite the above concerns, the aversiveness of SCF has not been empirically verified.
For example, in VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016), participants who received SCF reported
that they were comfortable with the fact that others saw their performance data. Additionally,
their reported satisfaction and stress did not differ from participants who received graphic
individual feedback. However, both studies were conducted in the laboratory and those results
may not transfer to the workplace because participants might not have encountered some of the
aversive contingencies that employees would be likely to encounter. First, participants in these
studies did not typically know or interact with each other, which eliminates the possibility of
social consequences from peers for performance. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
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experimenters did not provide differential consequences based on performance or ranking. In an
actual work setting, supervisors would be likely to criticize workers whose performance was
consistently below their peers and such criticism would be likely to increase the aversiveness of
SCF. Additionally, in actual work settings, organizational rewards, such as pay raises, choice job
assignments, promotions, etc., are likely to be competitive and distributed only to highly-ranked
performers, which would also be likely to increase the aversiveness of SCF (Buskist & Morgan,
1988; Johnson & Dickinson, 2010).
Although the aversiveness of SCF has not yet been directly documented, data from a
recent study by Moon, Lee, Lee, and Oah (2017) suggest that SCF may well be aversive for low
performers, even in the absence of differential consequences from peers and supervisors. These
authors examined the relative effectiveness of objective feedback and SCF on the performance of
high and low performers. The study, conducted in the laboratory, was a between-group study
with the following conditions: (a) high performers who were given objective feedback, (b) high
performers who were given SCF, (c) low performers who were given objective feedback, and (d)
low performers who were given SCF. The task was a computerized task and the dependent
variable was the number of correctly completed work units. Participants in the objective
feedback conditions were given written feedback on the number of work units they completed
correctly. Participants in the SCF conditions were given written feedback only on their relative
ranking in the group, which included both the high and low performers. The results revealed an
interaction between performance level and the type of feedback. High performers performed
significantly better when they received SCF than when they received objective feedback;
however, low performers performed significantly better when they received objective feedback
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than when they received SCF. These latter results suggest that the SCF rankings had a negative
effect on performance.
Purpose of the Study
The main purpose of the current study was to compare the effects of graphic SCF with
tiered goals and private graphic individualized feedback. Currently, it is unclear whether the
normative component of SCF contributes to its effectiveness. Rather, similar effects may occur
when individuals are given non-normative tiered goals and provided with private, individual
feedback. This study contributed to the feedback literature by conducting a component analysis
of the variables that make feedback effective and, specifically, whether normative standards
affect performance differently than goal-setting, research advocated by Einarsson (2016) and
Johnson (2013). As stated above, the results of the study also have important practical
implications for organizations, given the potential aversiveness of normative SCF; aversiveness
that can be avoided by the use of tiered goals and individual feedback.
The study also extended VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016) by comparing the
relative effects of SCF when individuals are paid hourly and when they are paid monetary
incentives. Both studies found that SCF was more effective than private graphic individual
feedback, but the effects of SCF may have been considerably mitigated by incentives in
Einarsson’s study. To review, VanStelle’s SCF group performed 18% better than the individual
feedback group, whereas Einarsson’s SCF group performed only 7% better. As noted by
Einarsson, “Companies may decide to forego a 5% - 7% performance increase in favor of a
feedback system that employees may prefer, whereas they may not be willing to forego an 18% 20% increase” (p. 47). The differences in performance enhancement (i.e., 18% versus 7%) were
derived from an across-study comparison based on only two studies. A direct comparison of the
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relative effects of SCF under hourly and incentive pay conditions is, thus, warranted and in
keeping with Balcazar et al.’s (1985-1986) advice that because different feedback systems may
have different effects depending on the reinforcement system, it is important to examine them
under different systems.
Finally, this study also partially replicated Sundberg’s (2015) study by examining the
effects of tiered goals on performance when individuals are paid hourly and when they are paid
monetary incentives. As discussed earlier, in that study, the performance of participants who
were paid hourly pay was comparable to the performance of participants who were paid
monetary incentives. Sundberg’s results are both practically and conceptually interesting because
of how unusual they are. The results of the current study help determine the validity of those
findings.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at Western Michigan
University. Before recruitment, approval for the study was obtained from the University’s
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The approval letter is provided in Appendix A.
Only individuals who signed a consent form were included in the study (see Appendices B and C
for the consent forms).
Participants were recruited using an in-class recruitment script (see Appendix D) and
recruitment flyers (see Appendix E). There were three requirements to qualify for the study.
First, recruits that had participated in other studies using the same medical data entry program
were excluded from the study because experience with the task might have affected how they
responded. Second, participants were excluded if they currently had or previously had any sort of
data entry job. Past studies have found that participants with data entry experience are
significantly better at performing this task than naive performers, and introduce extreme
variability into the dataset. Requirements for the first two criteria were assessed using a
questionnaire (see Appendix F). Finally, participants had to be able to attend four 45-minute
sessions.
Participants were paid either a fixed rate or monetary incentives based on their
performance and were paid, in cash, after debriefing. Debriefing occurred the week after their
last session. If participants dropped out before the end of the study, they were paid the amount
they earned at the point of their withdrawal.
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Eighty-one participants were recruited and passed inclusion criteria. Of the 81
participants in the study, 78% were female (n=60) and 22% male (n=18). Average age of
participants was 19.9 years.
Setting
The experimental setting consisted of three rooms (2532, 2510, 2512) in Wood Hall,
Western Michigan University. Two of the rooms, 2510 and 2512, were small rooms that were
used for greeting participants, delivering feedback, and scheduling the next session. The main
experimental room, 2532, was across the hall and had three cubicle workstations, sectioned off
with dividers. Each workstation contained an adjustable chair, computer, keyboard, mouse, and
gel palm rest.
Experimental Task and Alternative Activities
The experimental task was a computerized data entry task designed to simulate the job of
a medical data entry clerk. The computer presented medical records that displayed a patient’s
name, ID number, date of birth, current age, gender, and medical test results. Also displayed
were two boxes, one for male and one for female, indicating the range of test results that would
be “within range” or normal. Participants first entered the patient’s ID number into a blank
“Patient ID” box. They then determined whether the patient’s medical results were in or out of
range and clicked the “within range” or “out of range” button. When participants clicked the
“Submit” button, a new medical record was presented. A screenshot of the task can be found in
Appendix G.
Participants had access to six games on the desktop (Angry Birds, Jewel Quest, Text
Twist, Solitaire, Bejeweled 2, and Mahjong), the Internet, and their cell phones. They were
required to mute the sounds on all devices to prevent disruptions to other participants. These off-
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task activities were designed to simulate off-task activities in the work place. Without such
activities, participants might have spent the entire session working on the experimental task
simply because there was nothing else to do, which could have negated the effects of the
independent variables. A recent survey of 1,034 employees reported that workers frequently
engage in non-work activities using company computers or personal mobile devices (Carey &
Trap, 2014). Specifically, 68% indicated that they checked personal e-mail daily, 52% indicated
that they texted daily, 23% indicated that they played games daily, and 21% indicated that they
posted to social media daily. These data support the ecological validity of the off-task activities
in the current study.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable was the number of correctly entered medical records per
session. This variable could have been affected by three factors, which were measured as
secondary dependent variables: (1) time-on-task, measured by the average amount of time the
participant spent performing the task per session, (2) accuracy, measured by the average
percentage of records completed correctly per session, and (3) rate, measured by the average
number of records completed per minute per session when the participant was on-task. Time-offtask was defined as any pause in responding longer than 30 seconds. Time-on-task was
calculated by subtracting the cumulative number of seconds off-task from the 45-minute session
time. The computer program automatically collected all dependent variables. After each day, the
experimenter saved the data on a password protected flash drive. This was done to prevent any
loss of data due to computer malfunction.
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After the last experimental session, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
about their satisfaction, stress, and performance with respect to the specific condition to which
they belonged. The questionnaires can be found in Appendix H.
Independent Variables
The independent variables were the type of graphic feedback display (a display of
individual performance and five goals versus a display of individual performance and the
performance of five other group members) and the type of pay system (fixed pay versus
incentive pay). The display of individual performance along with five goals will be referred to as
the goal-setting condition and the display of individual performance and performance of five
other group members will be referred to as the SCF condition. There were four experimental
conditions: (a) goal-setting with fixed pay, (b) goal-setting with incentive pay, (c) SCF with
fixed pay, and (d) SCF with incentive pay.
Participants in the goal-setting conditions were given five tiered goals (200, 250, 300,
350, and 400 correctly completed records). These corresponded to about the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and 90th percentiles of the performance of 80 undergraduate students who were participants in
Einarsson (2016). Those participants performed the same experimental task and received piecerate pay for each correctly completed record. The percentiles were based on the first three
experimental sessions completed by the participants. The goals were altered slightly to make it
easier for the participants to remember them.
For the SCF conditions, the performances of five participants from Einarsson (2016)
were displayed on the graph along with the actual performance of the current participant. The
performances of these five participants were selected for display because they most closely
averaged each of the five goals (across three experimental sessions). The performances were
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adjusted slightly to exactly match the corresponding goals. The participants were told that the
graph displays their performance along with the performance of five other individuals in their
group.
To isolate the effects of the two graphic feedback displays, no vocal evaluative feedback
or within-session feedback was provided in any condition.
As indicated previously, participants either received fixed pay or incentive pay.
Participants in the fixed pay conditions were paid $6.00 per session. Participants in the incentive
pay conditions were paid two cents for each correctly completed record. If these participants
correctly completed the average number of records, determined from previous research, they, too
would have earned approximately $6.00 per session. As with the goals, average performance was
calculated from the first three experimental sessions completed by Einarsson’s (2016) 80
participants. The average was actually 299 correctly completed records in that study; thus, if
participants had performed at the average, they would have actually earned $5.98 per session
rather than $6.00 per session.
Goal-setting with fixed pay. Participants in this condition were paid $6.00 for all their
sessions, independent of their performance. The instructional script can be found in Appendix I.
Before each session, except the first, participants were shown a line graph that displayed the
number of medical records they correctly completed in their previous sessions along with the
performance goals. The number of correctly completed medical records and the amount that the
participant earned in the preceding session were listed at the bottom of the graph and updated for
each session. An example goal-setting graph can be found in Appendix J.
Goal-setting with incentive pay. Participants in this condition were paid two cents per
correctly entered medical record for the three experimental sessions. The instructional script can
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be found in Appendix K. Both goal-setting groups received the same type of graphic feedback
(Appendix J).
Social comparison feedback with fixed pay. Participants in this condition were paid
$6.00 for all their sessions, independent of their performance. The instructional script can be
found in Appendix L. Before each experimental session, participants in this condition received a
line graph that displayed the number of medical records that they correctly completed in their
previous sessions along with the number of medical records correctly completed by each
individual in their group, and their ranking within the group. The number of correctly completed
medical records and the amount that the participant earned in the preceding session were listed at
the bottom of the graph and updated for each session. As indicated previously the data for the
other individuals were based on five of Einarsson’s (2016) participants. An example of the SCF
graph can be found in Appendix M. Although the graph in the appendix displays the
performance of the other five group members for all four sessions, the data for the five group
members were revealed session by session, as it would be in an actual applied setting. For
example, when the experimenter gave the graph to participants before session 2, it only
contained performance data for the five group members from session 1. Similarly, the session 3
graph only contained performance data for the first two sessions.
In an attempt to emulate the typical social contingencies associated with SCF, the
performance data were identified by name. The participant’s real name was displayed on the
graph. The other names were fake names.
Social comparison feedback with incentive pay. Participants in this condition were
paid two cents per correctly entered medical record for the three experimental sessions. The
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instructional script can be found in Appendix N. Both SCF groups received the same type of
feedback graph (Appendix M).
Experimental Design
A 2 x 2 factorial design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to the four
conditions, and each condition had 19-22 participants. Each participant completed four 45minute sessions, a covariate session and three experimental sessions.
Statistical Analysis
A two-factor analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to analyze the differences
among the groups, using the data from the first session as the covariate to control for data entry
skills and the average number of correctly completed records for the three experimental sessions.
Prior to running the ANCOVA, the regression slopes were tested to ensure homogeneity.
The relationships between the dependent variables (time-on-task, accuracy, and data
entry rate) and average number of correctly completed medical records were calculated using
Pearson product moment correlations.
After the study, participants in all conditions were asked to answer questions measuring
stress, satisfaction, and doing their best to improve their performance on a scale from one to five.
As mentioned earlier, the post-study questionnaires can be found in Appendix H. Differences
between conditions were analyzed using ANOVAs. In addition, participants in the SCF
conditions were asked to indicate the extent to which they were uncomfortable having others in
their group see their performance, and the differences between the two SCF conditions were also
analyzed using an ANOVA.
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Experimental Procedures
Random assignment. After participants were recruited, they were randomly assigned to
one of the four groups. Randomization into groups was done using a random number generator
with numbers between one and four.
Introductory session. The first meeting with potential participants was held to obtain
informed consent, assess if they met the requirements, and train them on the task and alternative
activities (i.e., computer games and how to access the Internet browser). The training script can
be found in Appendix O.
Covariate session. Before the covariate session and for all subsequent sessions,
participants met with the experimenter in either room 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall. Participants
were all paid fixed pay, $6.00, and were instructed to “do their best” during this session. The
script for the covariate session can be found in Appendix P.
Based on an analysis of data from Einarsson (2016) a minimum performance standard of
100 correctly completed records was set for the covariate session, and participants were
eliminated from the study if they failed to meet that standard. The standard was approximately
2.5 standard deviations below the mean and the lowest score attained in Einarsson (2016),
separated from the next four to five lowest scores by more than 30 records. Because the covariate
session was supposed to be an estimate of “do your best” performance, it was considered
necessary to remove participants from the study who did not follow the instructions. Nine
participants were eliminated due to this standard, three from each of the goal setting groups, one
from the SCF fixed pay group and two from the SCF incentive pay group. Of the participants
who were eliminated, three were female and six were male.
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Experimental sessions. Participants in the incentive conditions were trained and given a
short quiz to check their understanding of incentive pay systems. Participants were required to
score 100% on the quiz, but were able to take multiple versions of the quiz until they scored
100%. The script for the incentive pay system training can be found in Appendix Q. After
participants had scored 100% on the quiz, the script for the experimental sessions was read. The
scripts for the experimental sessions, presented earlier, can be found in Appendices I, K, L, and
N. After the scripted instructions, participants were escorted to a workstation in room 2532,
Wood Hall. The participants started the session once they were ready. The computerized work
task program automatically stopped after 45 minutes. After the session, participants confirmed
their next session.
Debriefing session. Participants were debriefed after completing their fourth, and final,
session. During the debriefing session, participants were asked to complete the stress/satisfaction
questionnaire relevant to their group (see Appendix H). Once participants had finished the
questionnaire, the experimenter explained the purpose of the study. The experimenter told
participants how they did in their last session, answered any questions they had, and paid them.
Debriefing scripts can be found in Appendix R. Participants were given a receipt and paid in
cash. The receipt can be found in Appendix S. Lastly, the experimenter thanked participants for
their participation in the study.
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RESULTS
Primary Analysis
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for correctly completed records for
the four conditions during the covariate session and the experimental sessions. Table 2 displays
the adjusted means for correctly completed records.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Correctly Completed Records

Condition
Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay
Social Comparison Feedback and Fixed Pay
Goal-Setting and Incentive Pay
Social Comparison Feedback and Incentive Pay

n
20
22
19
20

Sessions
Covariate
Experimental
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
205.50 58.05
255.33 66.00
208.59 55.76
270.17 87.28
195.79 55.42
255.56 88.91
223.15 56.83
287.98 79.72

Table 2
Adjusted Means for Correctly Completed Records
Condition
Fixed Pay Incentive Pay Overall
Goal-Setting
258.40
269.00
263.70
Social Comparison Feedback
270.00
286.80
278.40
Overall
264.21
277.89

ANCOVA requires homogeneous regression slopes and an analysis of the regression
slopes determined them to be homogeneous, F(3, 80) = .40, p = .754. Having met the
requirements, a two-factor ANCOVA was conducted to analyze differences between the
conditions on the primary dependent variable (average number of correctly completed records).
Table 3 displays the source table for the two-factor ANCOVA. The adjusted means for the goal-
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setting feedback and the social comparison feedback interventions (Factor A) were 263.70 and
278.40, respectively. The difference of 14.70 was not statistically significant (F = 1.85, p =
0.178). The adjusted means for the fixed pay and incentive pay interventions (Factor B) were
264.21 and 277.89, respectively. The difference of 13.68 was not statistically significant either
(F = 1.63, p = 0.205). No significant interaction effect was detected (F = 0.09, p = 0.771).
Table 3
Source Table for Two-Factor Analysis of Covariance
Source
df
SS
MS
F
p
Covariate
1 277001 277001 119.70 0.000
Type of Feedback (A) 1
4284
4284
1.85 0.178
Type of Pay (B)
1
3779
3779
1.63 0.205
AxB
1
198
198
0.09 0.771
Error
76 175878
2314
Total
80 482113

Revised Primary Analysis
A visual inspection of the data for performers who were not positively affected by the
incentives led to the detection of a potential sequence effect. During the covariate session,
participants were instructed to “do their best” and paid $6.00. During the experimental sessions,
participants in the incentive conditions were paid two cents per correct record. In the incentive
conditions, participants who correctly completed the average number of records, as determined
from a previous study (Einarsson, 2016), would have earned about $6.00. Thus, the low
performers in the current study earned less money during the first experimental session than
during the covariate session. Inspection of the data revealed that if participants earned less than
$4.00 in the first experimental session they were unlikely to improve their performance in the
subsequent sessions. These unintended consequences of the experimental arrangements did not
seem to apply to average and high performers. Because of this, the data for all participants (in all
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four conditions) who correctly completed fewer than 199 records in the first experimental
session were removed from the dataset. This resulted in the removal of data for seventeen
participants, three to five in each condition. Of those, thirteen were female and four were male.
Table 4 shows the revised number of participants, means, and standard deviations for correctly
completed records for each condition and Table 5 shows the revised adjusted means.
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Correctly Completed Records Excluding Low Performers

Condition
Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay
Social Comparison Feedback and Fixed Pay
Goal-Setting and Incentive Pay
Social Comparison Feedback and Incentive Pay

n
17
17
14
16

Sessions
Covariate
Experimental
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
218.88 51.38
268.67 59.42
226.35 48.51
304.18 65.99
216.71 45.75
294.67 63.44
234.56 57.60
324.02 69.41

Table 5
Adjusted Means for Correctly Completed Records Excluding Low Performers
Condition
Fixed Pay Incentive Pay Overall
Goal-Setting
273.28
301.20
287.23
Social Comparison Feedback
302.41
315.20
308.82
Overall
287.84
308.21

An analysis of the regression slopes determined them to be homogeneous, F(3, 63) = .46,
p = .710. As before, a two-factor ANCOVA was conducted to analyze differences between the
conditions on the primary dependent variable. Table 6 displays the source table for the twofactor ANCOVA excluding low performers. The adjusted means for the goal-setting feedback
and the social comparison feedback interventions (Factor A) were 287.23 and 308.82,
respectively. The difference was 21.59, which is considerably larger than the difference between
the adjusted means (14.70) when low performers were included in the analysis. Unlike the
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previous analysis, the difference between these adjusted means was statistically significant (F =
4.55, p = 0.037). These results confirm that participants in the social comparison feedback
conditions performed higher than those in the goal-setting conditions. The adjusted means for the
fixed pay and incentive pay interventions (Factor B) were 287.84 and 308.21, respectively. The
difference was 20.37, which again is considerably larger than the difference (13.28) in the
original analysis that included low performers. The difference between these means was also
statistically significant (F = 4.11, p = 0.047). These results confirm that participants in the
incentive pay conditions performed higher than those in the fixed pay conditions. No significant
interaction effect was detected (F = 0.56, p = 0.457).
Table 6
Source Table for Two-Factor Analysis of Covariance Excluding Low Performers
Source
df
SS
MS
F
p
Covariate
1 115214 115214 71.88 0.000
Type of Feedback (A) 1
7295
7295 4.55 0.037
Type of Pay (B)
1
6587
6587 4.11 0.047
AxB
1
900
900 0.56 0.457
Error
59 94563
1603
Total
63 236067

Due to the significant findings from the revised primary analysis, all of the following
results and analyses will be based on data excluding low performers. However, analyses based
on all of the participants can be found in Appendix T.
Secondary Analysis
Table 7 displays the means and standard deviations for the secondary dependent
variables, the three factors that could have affected the primary dependent variable (correctly
completed records).
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The relationships between the primary dependent variable and the secondary dependent
variables were calculated using Pearson product moment correlations and the results are shown
in Table 8. There were two significant correlations. There was a close to perfect positive
correlation between correctly completed medical records and rate, and a moderate positive
correlation between correctly completed medical records and time on task. Other correlations
were not significant.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Accuracy, Rate, and Time on Task

Accuracy
Condition

n

Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay

Mean

SD

Rate

Time on Task

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

17 97.40% 2.66%

6.35

1.20

42.75

4.05

Social Comparison Feedback and
Fixed Pay

17 95.97% 7.36%

6.90

1.22

43.05

4.38

Goal-Setting and Incentive Pay

14 97.36% 2.48%

6.95

1.40

42.33

3.25

Social Comparison Feedback and
Incentive Pay

16 97.06% 2.54%

7.35

1.47

43.81

2.07

Table 8
Correlations Between the Primary and Secondary Dependent Variables

Correctly Completed Medical Records
Time on Task
Rate
*p < 0.001

Time on Task
.48*

Rate
.94*
.18

Accuracy
.14
-.06
.28

Questionnaire Analysis
Excluding the low performers, 64 participants answered the post-study questionnaire. All
questions used a Likert scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Participants in
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all conditions answered four questions related to stress, motivation, and satisfaction. Table 9
shows the means and standard deviations for each of the four questions. Tables 10, 11, 12, and
13 display information from the subsequent ANOVAs that were conducted to determine whether
differences existed between the groups means. No significant difference was detected between
the conditions for any of the four questions.
Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Stress, Motivation, and Satisfaction Questions
“I was stressed
or anxious
when
performing the
task”
Mean
SD

“I did my
best every
session”

“I tried to
improve my
performance
from session to
session”
Mean
SD

Mean

SD

1.24

4.18

.64

4.41

1.82

.81

4.00

1.12

14

1.93

1.00

3.93

Social
Comparison
Feedback and
Incentive Pay

16

1.75

.86

Overall

64

1.83

.97

Condition

n

Goal-Setting
and Fixed Pay

17

1.82

Social
Comparison
Feedback and
Fixed Pay

17

Goal-Setting
and Incentive
Pay

“I was
satisfied
with the pay
system”
Mean

SD

.71

4.88

.33

4.65

.60

4.76

.44

.73

4.71

.61

4.64

.63

4.38

.50

4.75

.45

4.50

.89

4.13

.79

4.63

.60

4.70

.61

An extra question was included on the questionnaire for the SCF conditions to measure
whether participants were uncomfortable having other people see their performance. As before,
this question used a Likert scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. In the fixed
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pay condition, the mean rating for the question “I was uncomfortable having other people in my
group see my performance” was 1.65 (SD = 1.17). The mean rating for the incentive condition
was 1.6 (SD = 1.12). The mean ratings suggest that participants were not uncomfortable with
other people being able to see how well they were performing. Table 14 displays the information
from ANOVA that was conducted to see if there was a difference between the two conditions.
No significant difference was detected.
Table 10
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Stressed or Anxious When Performing the Task”
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3
.24
Error
60 58.87
Total
63 59.11

MS

F

p

.08 .08 .970
.98

Table 11
ANOVA Source Table for “I Did My Best Every Session”
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3 1.85
Error
60 37.15
Total
63 39.00

MS

F

p

.62 1.00 .401
.62

Table 12
ANOVA Source Table for “I Tried to Improve My Performance from Session to Session”
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3 1.14
Error
60 21.86
Total
63 23.00

MS

F

p

.38 1.05 .379
.36
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Table 13
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Satisfied with the Pay System”
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3 1.32
Error
60 22.04
Total
63 23.36

MS

F

p

.44 1.20 .318
.37

Table 14
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Uncomfortable Having Other People in My Group See My
Performance”
Source

df

SS

MS

F

p

Treatment 1
.02 .02 .01 .909
Error
30 39.48 1.32
Total
31 39.50

Goal Analysis
The differences in goal achievement between the conditions were explored. In the goalsetting conditions, the five goals were set so that approximately 90% (Goal 1), 75% (Goal 2),
50% (Goal 3), 25% (Goal 4), and 10% (Goal 5) of the participants were expected to achieve
them, based on data from Einarsson (2016). In the SCF conditions, the performances of the five
comparison participants that were displayed on the graph corresponded to the five goals. Goal
achievement was defined as meeting the goal at least once during the three experimental
sessions. Table 15 displays the percentage of participants, excluding low performers, in each
condition who achieved each goal-level. Comparing the SCF condition to its goal-setting
counterpart under the same payment condition, SCF resulted in higher percentages of goal
attainment for every goal.
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Table 16 shows the percentage of all participants (i.e., including the low performers) that
achieved each of the five goals. While the percentage of participants that met each goal varied
considerably across conditions, overall, each goal was achieved by the same percentage of
participants as predicted, within a margin of error of five percent. Because the goals were based
on data from Einarsson (2016) which included low performers, the percentages in Table 16
indicate that the goals were set at the appropriate levels, accurately capturing the range and level
of participant performance in this study.
Table 15
Goal Achievement by Condition

Condition

n

Goal
#1

Goal
#2

Goal
#3

Goal
#4

Goal
#5

Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay

17

100%

70.59%

35.29%

23.53%

5.88%

Social Comparison Feedback
and Fixed Pay

17

100%

94.12%

64.71%

41.71%

11.76%

Goal-Setting and Incentive Pay 14

100%

92.86%

64.29%

14.29%

14.29%

Social Comparison Feedback
and Incentive Pay

16

100%

93.75%

81.25%

43.75%

18.75%

Overall

64

100%

87.50%

60.94%

32.81%

12.50%
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Table 16
Goal Achievement by Condition – All Participants
Goal
#1

Goal
#2

Goal
#3

Goal
#4

Goal
#5

Condition

n

Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay

20 95.00%

60.00%

30.00%

25.00%

5.00%

22 81.81%

72.73%

50.00%

31.82%

9.09%

19 78.95%

68.42%

47.37%

10.53%

10.53%

20 95.00%

80.00%

70.00%

40.00%

15.00%

81 87.65%

70.37%

49.38%

27.16%

9.88%

Social Comparison Feedback
and Fixed Pay
Goal-Setting and Incentive
Pay
Social Comparison Feedback
and Incentive Pay
Overall
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DISCUSSION
Primary and Revised Primary Analyses
The main purpose of this study was to compare the effects of graphic SCF and tiered
goals when individuals received fixed pay and incentive pay. The initial ANCOVA did not
reveal any significant differences between the conditions for the primary dependent variable, the
average number of correctly completed records. However, the primary analysis may not
accurately reflect the true population differences. As mentioned in the Results, a visual
inspection of the data revealed that low performers in the incentive conditions, unlike their
higher-performing counterparts, did not improve their performance across sessions. This unusual
pattern of performance probably resulted from the change in pay they received in the covariate
session and the experimental sessions. In the covariate session, they received a fixed payment of
$6.00; in the experimental sessions, they received 2 cents per correctly completed record.
Because of their low performance, they earned considerably less in the experimental sessions
than in the covariate session. Their low levels of responding during the experimental sessions,
thus, appear to have been an unintended consequence of the experimental arrangements in this
study.
The revised ANCOVA analysis, which excluded low performers in all four groups,
showed that participants performed better (a) when they received incentive pay than when they
received fixed pay, and (b) when they received graphic SCF than when they received graphic
feedback based on tiered goals.
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The results of this analysis are primarily important to the feedback literature because they
demonstrate that feedback about the performance of others, also known as public normative
feedback (Camden et al., 2011), can produce significantly higher levels of performance than
feedback based on tiered goals when individuals receive either hourly pay or incentive pay.
However, it should be noted that the performance differences between the SCF participants and
the goal-setting participants, while statistically significant, were not substantial from a practical
point of view. The SCF participants performed only about 7.5% better than the goal-setting
participants, which converts to an effect size of .37—a small effect size.
Both SCF and goal-setting feedback established individualized, ability-based sub-goals
for each performer in the study. That is, in terms of the content of the graphs, the graphic
feedback looked similar in the two conditions. However, the results indicate that the behavioral
mechanisms were different and that the normative component enhanced performance.
Specifically, the stimuli “Sydney”, “Li Ann”, “DeAndre”, “Alexis”, and “Trevor” produced
higher levels of performance than the stimuli “Goal 1”, “Goal 2”, “Goal 3”, “Goal 4”, and “Goal
5”.
The design of the study does not permit answers to the question of why participants, on
average, responded differently to SCF than goal-setting. It may be that people responded
differently to “Sydney” than to “Goal 1” because of an extensive history of exposure to positive
and negative consequences related to peer comparison. As mentioned in the Introduction, most
people have a long history in which performing well in groups is reinforced and performing
poorly in groups is punished. Another reason why people may have responded differently to the
names is that the performance levels of others might be perceived as more attainable than
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performance levels labeled as goals. In the past, for example, behaviors may have been
reinforced when individuals modeled the behaviors of better-performing peers and matched their
performance levels. These modeling behaviors may have generalized to the graphic SCF,
possibly by rule-control. That is, the SCF may have evoked a rule similar to “If they can do it, I
can do it”. In contrast, labeling performance levels as “goals” may exert slightly less control
because of past experiences in which individuals were assigned goals by others but they could
not reach them.
The results of the revised analysis are in line with previous results from VanStelle (2012)
and Einarsson (2016), and provide further evidence of the effectiveness of graphic SCF. As
discussed in the Introduction, VanStelle compared the effects of graphic displays of (a)
individual performance, (b) individual performance and average group performance, and (c)
individual performance and the individual performance of each group member (referred to as
SCF in the current study) when individuals were paid hourly. Performers who received SCF
performed significantly better than those who received individual and group average feedback,
who, in turn performed significantly better than those who received only individual feedback.
SCF participants performed about 18% better than individual feedback participants.
Einarsson (2016), who compared graphic individual feedback with graphic SCF when
individuals were paid incentives, also found that those who received SCF performed
significantly better than those who received individual feedback. In that study, SCF participants
performed about 7% better than individual feedback participants. The smaller difference is
probably due to the fact that the incentives themselves increased performance and thus
attenuated the effects of the two types of feedback. Regardless, the difference between the two
groups was statistically significant.
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As mentioned earlier in this section, in the current study, the graphic SCF participants
performed significantly better than the goal-setting participants, with a performance difference of
7.5%. Thus, in all three studies (Einarsson, 2016; VanStelle, 2012), graphic SCF resulted in
higher levels of performance than the alternatives that were examined, regardless of whether
participants received hourly pay or incentive pay. Further, although an across-study comparison
is problematic due to the exclusion of the low performers in the current study, when participants
were paid incentives, those who received SCF outperformed those who received individual
feedback (Einarsson, 2016) and those who received goal-setting feedback (the current study) by
relatively similar percentages, 7% and 5%, respectively.
As noted above, a comparison of the results of VanStelle (2012) and Einarsson (2016)
suggest that incentives mitigated the performance difference between the SCF participants and
the individual feedback participants. The results of the current study support that analysis
because incentives had a similar mitigating effect. When participants received hourly pay, SCF
participants performed about 11% better than goal-setting feedback participants; when
participants received incentives, SCF participants performed only about 5% better.
The significant results of the revised analysis differ from the results in Sundberg (2015).
Similar to the current study, Sundberg gave participants five tiered performance goals and
provided them with graphic feedback. In one condition participants received fixed pay and in
another condition participants received base pay plus piece rate pay. Although the adjusted mean
performance of the incented participants was higher than the adjusted mean performance of the
fixed pay participants, the difference was not statistically significant. In the current study, in
contrast, the adjusted mean difference between participants who received fixed pay and incentive
pay was statistically significant. And, although there was not a significant interaction effect in
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the current study, it is worth noting in this context that the adjusted mean performance of the
incented participants who received goal-setting feedback was about 10% higher than the adjusted
mean performance for the fixed pay participants who received goal-setting feedback. In
Sundberg, the percentage difference between the adjusted mean performances of the piece-rate
pay participants and fixed pay participants was similar—piece rate participants performed about
13% better than the fixed pay participants. Thus, the results of the tiered goal-setting conditions
in the current study are in line with both the direction and size of the difference in similar
conditions in Sundberg.
Secondary Analyses
There were two significant correlations between the primary dependent variable and the
secondary dependent variables. The first significant correlation was between rate and correctly
completed records, which had an almost perfect positive correlation. The second significant
relationship was between time on task and correctly completed records, which had a moderate
positive correlation. The results are similar to other studies using the same task (Sundberg, 2015;
VanStelle, 2012). Interestingly, the average and high performers in this study spent almost the
entire 45-minute session on task. For the four conditions, the lowest time on task mean was
42.33 minutes and the highest was 43.81 minutes. The time on task numbers are especially
notable with regards to the two fixed pay conditions in the study.
Questionnaire Analysis
According to the questionnaire responses, participants were not stressed or anxious
performing the task (1.83/5.00), were generally doing their best every session (4.14/5.00), were
trying to improve their performance every session (4.63/5.00), and were satisfied with the
payment system (4.70/5.00). The data in the study corroborate the questionnaire data because
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participants, in all four conditions, improved their performance, on average, from session to
session with one exception: The fixed pay SCF participants performed approximately the same
in sessions 2 and 3.
Participants in the SCF conditions seemed comfortable with their performance being
shown to other participants. The mean score for participants in the fixed pay SCF condition was
1.65/5.00 and the mean score for participants in the incentive pay SCF condition was 1.60/5.00.
The scores from both conditions in this study are consistent with those from VanStelle (2012)
and Einarsson (2016). However, it remains to be seen if the results generalize to actual work
settings. The results from this question on the questionnaire may not be applicable to real life
settings because participants did not know each other, did not interact with each other, and did
not receive any critique for low performances—all of which could be significant factors in
making SCF more aversive (Einarsson, 2016). In order to determine the aversiveness of SCF in
actual work settings, further research is required.
Goal Analysis
The goal analysis based on average and high performers revealed some interesting
differences between the groups. First, the goal-setting with fixed pay condition generally had the
lowest percentages of goal attainment. For example, in the other three conditions over 92% of
participants met the second goal; however only 70.59% of participants in the goal-setting with
fixed pay condition met it. Second, the SCF with fixed pay condition had similar or higher
percentages of goal attainment than the goal-setting with incentive condition. This is highlighted
for the fourth goal: 41.76% of the participants in the SCF with fixed pay condition attained the
goal but only 14.29% of the participants in the goal-setting with incentive condition attained it.

50
Strengths
This study was the first study to directly compare, and do a component analysis of,
normative feedback and goal setting, research suggested by Einarsson (2016) and Johnson
(2013). As a laboratory study, it was possible to isolate the effects of the graphic SCF and
graphic goal-setting feedback on performance from other types of feedback. As demonstrated by
Johnson (2013), evaluative responses about performance by the researcher can significantly
impact performance and researchers in this study were trained to avoid giving any type of
evaluative feedback on performance when handing graphs to participants.
Another strength of this study was that the graphic SCF only contained information about
five other performers. Participants in the SCF condition in VanStelle (2012) complained about
“general confusion” due to having so many performances portrayed in the graphic feedback. The
SCF condition in VanStelle had about 16-19 participants. Einarsson (2016) had 27 participants in
the SCF condition, although that study took steps to make the performance of the receiver of the
graph easily identifiable. This study, by having only five performances to compare to in the SCF
condition, eliminated any notion of clutter on the graph being given to participants and
demonstrated that graphic SCF can have a significant effect with as few as five other performers.
Limitations
A major limitation of this study concerns the way participants were paid in the covariate
session and experimental sessions. Low performers in the incentive conditions earned
considerably less money in the experimental sessions than they did during the covariate session
when they were paid $6.00 regardless of how well they performed. A visual inspection of the
data indicated that the performance of these participants during the experimental sessions was
reduced by this decrease in pay. This reduction seems to have been why the mean differences
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between the major dependent variable were not statistically significant for either of the
independent variables, the pay system or type of feedback. It was only after excluding low
performers from all conditions in the revised analysis, that significant differences were found
between both factors in the study. This suggests that the results of the study may only generalize
to average and high performers. A replication of this study that avoids the sequence effects
detected in this study is required in order to further analyze the effects of the independent
variables examined in this study.
Although the laboratory setting made it possible to isolate the effects of the independent
variables on performance, it was also responsible for isolating participants from various social
consequences that people experience when working with other people in actual workplaces,
many of which could make SCF more aversive. This is a limitation with regards to the
generalization of the effectiveness of SCF and how aversive it is. Lastly, the performance of the
undergraduate participants in the study may not have been fully under the control of the
independent variables used in this study. Rather, some participants may have been mainly
motivated to participate in the study because of the extra course credit they received. If that was
the case, it could help explain the small difference that was found between the fixed and
incentive pay conditions in the study.
Future Research
As previously noted, the revised primary analysis excluded low performers and it was
only at that point that the differences between both factors in the current study were significantly
different. Future research should replicate this study in a way that avoids the carry-over effects of
the covariate session to the experimental sessions. It is important to determine whether the
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results of such a study would be consistent with the results of the revised analysis in the current
study.
Future research should implement SCF in actual work settings while specifically
collecting information about how staff react to its use and whether social interactions among
staff change. It would be of great value to be able to compare the results of the three laboratory
studies, VanStelle (2012), Einarsson (2016), and the current study, to the results of an applied
field study that implemented this type of SCF and compared it to other types of feedback.
Finally, future studies should further examine the utility of tiered goals and, specifically,
whether tiered goals can be made more effective with different instructions and evaluative
feedback. In this study, the only information that participants received related to the goals was
“Notice that there are five performance goals listed for you on the graph”. An anecdotal
observation from the study was that some participants would seek out clarification or ask
repeatedly if they were supposed to achieve these goals after hearing the performance goals
instructions. This suggests that if the instructions had been different and asked participants to
attain the highest goal possible, that such instructions along with evaluative feedback after each
session might have evoked a new rule making goal achievement function as a reinforcer, or a
stronger reinforcer than it was. It would be interesting to see an evaluation of the effects of clear
directions and evaluative feedback about reaching higher and higher goals to the participants and
if such directions and evaluative feedback would have a larger impact with tiered goals
compared to SCF.
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Western Michigan University
Department of Psychology
Principal Investigator:
Student Investigator:
Title of Study:

Alyce M. Dickinson, Ph.D.
Yngvi F. Einarsson, M.A.
Performance on a Medical Transcription Data Entry Task
When Participants Receive Performance Feedback

You have been asked to participate in a research project titled “Performance on a Medical
Transcription Data Entry Task When Participants Receive Performance Feedback.” This project
will serve as Yngvi Einarsson’s dissertation project under the supervision of Alyce Dickinson,
Ph.D. This informed consent document will explain the purpose of this research project and will
cover information related to the project, including expected time commitments, research
procedures to be used in the study, and any risks or benefits associated with participating in this
research project.
What are we trying to find out in this study?
The purpose of this study is to examine productivity levels on a medical data entry task across
time when performers are given performance feedback.
Who can participate in this study?
Three inclusionary criteria will be used. First, you must not have participated in performance
management research projects using the medical data entry task. Second, you will be excluded if
you currently have or have had a data processing job. Lastly, you must be available for four 45minute sessions during the Spring 2017 semester.
Where will the study take place?
The study will be conducted in room 2532, Wood Hall.
What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
You must be available for four 45-minute sessions in Spring 2017 semester for a total time
commitment of approximately 3-4 hours.
What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
You will be asked to perform a computer-based medical transcription data entry task, a task
designed to simulate the job of a medical data entry clerk. The computer program will provide
you with data corresponding to patients. You will first type the patient’s ID number into a box
labeled “PATIENT ID,” and then, based on the information provided by the program, indicate
whether the medical data for that patient is inside or outside the normal range by clicking on the
appropriate button. After you click the “Submit” button, information about another patient will
be presented. Also, after your last session, you will be asked to answer questions about your
experience during the study. Lastly, you will be asked not to talk to anyone about the features of
this study.
What information is being measured during this study?
The computer will automatically take measures of your performance on the medical transcription
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data entry task. Also, at the end of the study you will be asked to indicate your satisfaction with
the procedures and how much stress you felt performing the task.
What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
The nature of this computer-based task is one that requires little physical effort, and should not
expose you to risks greater than those you experience in your everyday activities. During
sessions you may become tired or experience minor physical discomfort or stress. To minimize
these risks, you may take breaks whenever you like. During these breaks you may play one of
several computer games on the workstation computer, browse the Internet, play with your
smartphone or just relax.
What are the benefits of participating in this study?
Data from your participation may benefit the general scientific community by providing
information on performance feedback and productivity. You may also learn about research
through participation in this study. This study will add to our understanding of how working
conditions affect performance, satisfaction, and stress. The findings from analogue studies such
as this can be applied in workplace settings.
Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
Besides the time commitment of approximately 3-4 total hours, there are no costs associated with
participating in this study.
Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
For each of the four experimental sessions, you will be compensated. You will receive about
$6.00 for each 45-minute session. The amount earned may be dependent on your performance.
You will be paid in cash during the debriefing session, after your last experimental session. If you
decide to withdraw from this study, you will be paid for your performance up until the point of
withdrawal.
Who will have access to the information collected during the study?
The principal investigator, the student investigator, and the research assistants will have access to
the information collected during this study. When you begin the study, you will be assigned a
code number so that your individual progress can be tracked while your identity is held strictly
confidential. When the data from the study are presented or published, your data will be
combined with the data from others, and only group data will be presented. You will not be
identified.
What if you want to stop participating in this study?
You can choose to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, without penalty.
The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent.
If you should have any questions before or during the study, you can contact the primary
investigator, Dr. Alyce Dickinson at (269) 387-4473, or the student investigator at (269) 7794297. You may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at (269) 3878293 or the Vice President for Research at (269) 387-8298 if questions arise throughout the
course of this study.
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This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board
chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the stamped date is older than
one year.
Your signature below indicates that you read the above information and agree to participate in
the study.
____________________________________
Please Print Your Name
____________________________________
Participant Signature

_____________________
Date

Please keep the attached copy of this form for your records.
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Western Michigan University
Department of Psychology
Principal Investigator:
Student Investigator:
Title of Study:

Alyce M. Dickinson, Ph.D.
Yngvi F. Einarsson, M.A.
Performance on a Medical Transcription Data Entry Task
When Participants Receive Performance Feedback

You have been asked to participate in a research project titled “Performance on a Medical
Transcription Data Entry Task When Participants Receive Performance Feedback.” This project
will serve as Yngvi Einarsson’s dissertation project under the supervision of Alyce Dickinson,
Ph.D. This informed consent document will explain the purpose of this research project and will
cover information related to the project, including expected time commitments, research
procedures to be used in the study, and any risks or benefits associated with participating in this
research project.
What are we trying to find out in this study?
The purpose of this study is to examine productivity levels on a medical data entry task across
time when performers are given performance feedback.
Who can participate in this study?
Three inclusionary criteria will be used. First, you must not have participated in performance
management research projects using the medical data entry task. Second, you will be excluded if
you currently have or have had a data processing job. Lastly, you must be available for four 45minute sessions during the Spring 2017 semester.
Where will the study take place?
The study will be conducted in room 2532, Wood Hall.
What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
You must be available for four 45-minute sessions in Spring 2017 semester for a total time
commitment of approximately 3-4 hours.
What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
You will be asked to perform a computer-based medical transcription data entry task, a task
designed to simulate the job of a medical data entry clerk. The computer program will provide
you with data corresponding to patients. You will first type the patient’s ID number into a box
labeled “PATIENT ID,” and then, based on the information provided by the program, indicate
whether the medical data for that patient is inside or outside the normal range by clicking on the
appropriate button. After you click the “Submit” button, information about another patient will
be presented. Also, after your last session, you will be asked to answer questions about your
experience during the study. Lastly, you will be asked not to talk to anyone about the features of
this study.
What information is being measured during this study?
The computer will automatically take measures of your performance on the medical transcription

72
data entry task. Also, at the end of the study you will be asked to indicate your satisfaction with
the procedures and how much stress you felt performing the task.
What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
The nature of this computer-based task is one that requires little physical effort, and should not
expose you to risks greater than those you experience in your everyday activities. During
sessions you may become tired or experience minor physical discomfort or stress. To minimize
these risks, you may take breaks whenever you like. During these breaks you may play one of
several computer games on the workstation computer, browse the Internet, play with your
smartphone or just relax.
Additionally, your identity will be revealed to other participants. You will be assigned to a work
group, and your name will be displayed on feedback graphs for your group along with the names
of all other group members. This means that group members will be able to compare their
performance with the performance of others.
What are the benefits of participating in this study?
Data from your participation may benefit the general scientific community by providing
information on performance feedback and productivity. You may also learn about research
through participation in this study. This study will add to our understanding of how working
conditions affect performance, satisfaction, and stress. The findings from analogue studies such
as this can be applied in workplace settings.
Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
Besides the time commitment of approximately 3-4 total hours, there are no costs associated with
participating in this study.
Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
For each of the four experimental sessions, you will be compensated. You will receive about
$6.00 for each 45-minute session. The amount earned may be dependent on your performance.
You will be paid in cash during the debriefing session, after your last experimental session. If you
decide to withdraw from this study, you will be paid for your performance up until the point of
withdrawal.
Who will have access to the information collected during the study?
The principal investigator, the student investigator, and the research assistants will have access to
the information collected during this study. When you begin the study, you will be assigned a
code number so that your individual progress can be tracked while your identity is held strictly
confidential. When the data from the study are presented or published, your data will be
combined with the data from others, and only group data will be presented. You will not be
identified.
As described above, however, there is an exception to your confidentiality. Your first name and
the number of medical records you correctly complete will be displayed on a feedback graph and
shown to other members of your assigned group during the study (as described above in the
Risks section).
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What if you want to stop participating in this study?
You can choose to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, without penalty.
The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent.
If you should have any questions before or during the study, you can contact the primary
investigator, Dr. Alyce Dickinson at (269) 387-4473, or the student investigator at (269) 7794297. You may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at (269) 3878293 or the Vice President for Research at (269) 387-8298 if questions arise throughout the
course of this study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board
chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the stamped date is older than
one year.
Your signature below indicates that you read the above information and agree to participate in
the study.
____________________________________
Please Print Your Name
____________________________________
Participant Signature

_____________________
Date

Please keep the attached copy of this form for your records.
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Participant Recruitment Script
To be read aloud by the student investigator or research assistant at undergraduate classes:
“Hi, my name is X. I am visiting your class today to recruit participants for a study in
Industrial/Organizational psychology. The study will be conducted in Wood Hall. The study is
investigating performance on a data entry task when individuals are given performance feedback.
The task is meant to simulate the task of a medical data entry clerk. You will earn
approximately $24 for completing four 45-minute sessions. You may also be able to earn extra
credit in some of your classes, depending upon whether your instructor makes that available.
Anyone can be a participant, with the following exceptions: You must be available for
four 45-minute session during the Spring 2017 semester. Additionally, you cannot have
previously participated in other performance management studies using the same medical data
entry task. Further, you can’t have or have had a data processing job to be included in the study.
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. If you do
withdraw, you will be paid the money you have earned up to that point. Your willingness to
participate in the study or your withdrawal from the study will not affect your grade in any
course and your identity will remain confidential.
If you are interested in learning more about the study, please list your contact information
on the individual participant recruitment slips, which I will collect in a few minutes. You can
also contact us at yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu or (269) 779-4297 (will write these on the
board). Please remember that you must be available for 4 sessions during the Spring 2017
semester. I will contact you within the day to talk more about your potential participation.
Thank you for your time.”
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Research Participants Needed!!!

Are you interested in earning money and participating in
research over the semester?
We’re looking for individuals to participate in a study designed to examine productivity levels
on a medical data entry task when performers are given performance feedback. Participants
will earn approximately $24 for completing four 45-minute sessions.
To be eligible for participation in this study:
•
•
•

You must be available for four 45-minute sessions (in Wood Hall) during the Spring 2017
semester.
You cannot have previously participated in other performance management studies
using the same medical data entry task here at Western Michigan University
You must not have had or currently have a data processing job.

If you are interested in learning more about this study, please contact Yngvi Einarsson at
Yngvi.f.Einarsson@wmich.edu or (269) 997-4297. Be sure to provide your name, e-mail
address or telephone number, and the times you can be reached.
Please remember that you must be available for 4 sessions during the Spring 2017 semester.

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi Einarsson

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi.f.einarsson@wmich.edu

Yngvi Einarsson

All information is confidential!
For more information contact Yngvi Einarsson
E-mail: Yngvi.F.Einarsson@wmich.edu or Phone: (269) 779-4297
Thank you!
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Appendix F
Study Inclusion Questionnaire
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Participant #______
1. Sex:

Male

2. Age:

_____

Female

3. Are you receiving extra credit in one of your courses for participating in this study?
Yes: _____ No: _____
4. Have you ever participated in a study using a medical data entry task at Western Michigan
University (a screenshot of the task is available if you are not sure) ?
Yes: _____ No: _____
5. Do you currently or have you held a position that involved data entry?
Yes: _____ No: _____
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Appendix G
Screenshot of Experimental Task
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Appendix H
Participant Questionnaires

Participant #____________
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Exit Survey

We would like to begin by thanking you for your participation in this study. Please answer the
following questions about your experience.
1. I was stressed or anxious when performing the task
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
2. I did my best every session
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
3. I tried to improve my performance from session to session
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
4. I was satisfied with the pay system
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.

Participant #____________
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Exit Survey

We would like to begin by thanking you for your participation in this study. Please answer the
following questions about your experience.
1. I was stressed or anxious when performing the task
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
2. I did my best every session
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
3. I tried to improve my performance from session to session
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
4. I was satisfied with the pay system
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
5. I was uncomfortable having other people in my group see my performance
Strongly Disagree
1------------2------------3------------4------------5
Strongly Agree
Using the evaluation scale, please circle the number which reflects your opinion.
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Appendix I
Instructional Script: Goal-setting with Fixed Pay
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Beginning of Session Instructions:
**Before the participant arrives, the research assistant will take out the graph of previous
performance for the participant. When the participant arrives in either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall,
the research assistant will greet the participant and close the door (to ensure privacy).
**The research assistant will then read aloud:
“Remember that before you go to the experimental room, make sure that any devices you do bring
with you to the experimental room are completely silent in order not to disturb other participants
in the study.”
“You will be working on the medical transcription task again today. I want to remind you that you
will be paid $6.00 for this session and paid at the end of the study. If you feel tired and need a
break, you may take a break and will not be penalized for taking the break. You can relax, play
any of the available computer games, browse the Internet or use your smartphone as long as you
are not interrupting or disturbing other participants.”
“Here is a graph of your performance for each session so far. This graph will get updated with
your information after every session that you complete. Your data path is represented here (**RA
should point to the participant’s data). Notice that there are five performance goals listed for you
on the graph.
Also, at the bottom of the graph the number of medical records you correctly completed and the
amount you earned in the last session is listed.”

**The research assistant will give the participant a moment to look at the graph, and will then
answer any questions the participant may have about it.

**The research assistant will read aloud:
Please work at your own pace for the next 45 minutes. It is also important that you stay at your
workstation and do not talk to any of the other people present in the lab room. If you have any
questions, I will be on the other side of the room. You can stand up and let me know when your
session is over.”
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**The research assistant will take the participant to his or her workstation in the laboratory room
(2532 Wood Hall) and prompt him or her to begin their work session.
**The research assistant observes the participant start their session.

End of Session:
**The research assistant waits until the participant’s 45-minute session is over; the research
assistant will then take the participant back to either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall and remind the
participant when his or her next session is.

88

Appendix J
Sample of Goal-setting Graph
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Session #____
Correctly Completed Records ______________
Amount Earned ______________
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Appendix K
Instructional Script: Goal-setting with Incentive Pay
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Beginning of Session Instructions:
** When the participant arrives in either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall, the research assistant will
greet the participant and close the door (to ensure privacy).
**The research assistant will read aloud:
“Remember that before you go to the experimental room, make sure that any devices you do bring
with you to the experimental room are completely silent in order not to disturb other participants
in the study.”
“You will be working on the medical transcription task again today. Your pay will be based on
your performance and you will be paid 2 cents for every correct medical record in the session and
paid at the end of the study. If you feel tired and need a break, you may take a break and will not
be penalized for taking the break. You can relax, play any of the available computer games, browse
the Internet or use your smartphone as long as you are not interrupting or disturbing other
participants.”
“Here is a graph of your performance for each session so far. This graph will get updated with
your information after every session that you complete. Your data path is represented here (**RA
should point to the participant’s data). Notice that there are five performance goals listed for you
on the graph.
Also, at the bottom of the graph the number of medical records you correctly completed and the
amount you earned in the last session is listed.”

**The research assistant will give the participant a moment to look at the graph, and will then
answer any questions the participant may have about it.

Please work at your own pace for the next 45 minutes. It is also important that you stay at your
workstation and do not talk to any of the other people present in the lab room. If you have any
questions, I will be on the other side of the room. You can stand up and let me know when your
session is over.”
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**The research assistant will take the participant to his or her workstation in the laboratory room
(2532 Wood Hall) and prompt him or her to begin their work session.

**The research assistant observes the participant start their session.

End of Session:
**The research assistant waits until the participant’s 45 minute session is over; the research
assistant will then take the participant back to either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall and remind the
participant when his or her next session is.
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Appendix L
Instructional Script: Social Comparison Feedback with Fixed Pay
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Beginning of Session Instructions:
**Before the participant arrives, the research assistant will take out the graph of previous
performance for the participant. When the participant arrives in either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall,
the research assistant will greet the participant and close the door (to ensure privacy).
**The research assistant will read aloud:
“Remember that before you go to the experimental room, make sure that any devices you do bring
with you to the experimental room are completely silent in order not to disturb other participants
in the study.”
“You will be working on the medical transcription task again today. I want to remind you that you
will be paid $6.00 for this session and paid at the end of the study. If you feel tired and need a
break, you may take a break and will not be penalized for taking the break. You can relax, play
any of the available computer games, browse the Internet or use your smartphone as long as you
are not interrupting or disturbing other participants.”

**The research assistant will read aloud:
“Here is a graph of your performance for each session so far. This graph will get updated with
your information after every session that you complete. Your data path is represented here (**RA
should point to the participant’s data). Notice that there are other lines of data represented on the
graph, there are 5 other people in your group and the other data lines represent their performance.
Also, at the bottom of the graph the number of medical records you correctly completed and the
amount you earned in the last session is listed.”

**The research assistant will be permitted to answer any questions that the participant has about
where they fall in the data and can confirm or deny any of the participant’s assertions related to
the graph (i.e., so I am much lower/higher than participant 2,3,4 right?)

**The research assistant will give the participant a moment to look at the graph, and will then
answer any questions the participant may have about it.
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**The research assistant will read aloud:

Please work at your own pace for the next 45 minutes. It is also important that you stay at your
workstation and do not talk to any of the other people present in the lab room. If you have any
questions, I will be on the other side of the room. You can stand up and let me know when your
session is over.”

**The research assistant will take the participant to his or her workstation in the laboratory room
(2532 Wood Hall) and prompt him or her to begin their work session.
**The research assistant observes the participant start their session.

End of Session:
**The research assistant waits until the participant’s 45-minute session is over; the research
assistant will then take the participant back to either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall and remind the
participant when his or her next session is.
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Appendix M
Sample of Social Comparison Feedback Graph
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Session #____
Correctly Completed Records ______________
Amount Earned ______________
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Appendix N
Instructional Script: Social Comparison Feedback with Incentive Pay
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Beginning of Session Instructions:
**Before the participant arrives, the research assistant will take out the graph of previous
performance for the participant. When the participant arrives in either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall,
the research assistant will greet the participant and close the door (to ensure privacy).
**The research assistant will read aloud:
“Remember that before you go to the experimental room, make sure that any devices you do bring
with you to the experimental room are completely silent in order not to disturb other participants
in the study.”
“You will be working on the medical transcription task again today. Your pay will be based on
your performance and you will be paid 2 cents for every correct medical record in the session and
paid at the end of the study. If you feel tired and need a break, you may take a break and will not
be penalized for taking the break. You can relax, play any of the available computer games, browse
the Internet or use your smartphone as long as you are not interrupting or disturbing other
participants.”

**The research assistant will read aloud:
“Here is a graph of your performance for each session so far. This graph will get updated with
your information after every session that you complete. Your data path is represented here (**RA
should point to the participant’s data). Notice that there are other lines of data represented on the
graph, there are 5 other people in your group and the other data lines represent their performance.
Also, at the bottom of the graph the number of medical records you correctly completed and the
amount you earned in the last session is listed.”

**The research assistant will be permitted to answer any questions that the participant has about
where they fall in the data and can confirm or deny any of the participant’s assertions related to
the graph (i.e., so I am much lower/higher than participant 2,3,4 right?)
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**The research assistant will give the participant a moment to look at the graph, and will then
answer any questions the participant may have about it.
**The research assistant will read aloud:

Please work at your own pace for the next 45 minutes. It is also important that you stay at your
workstation and do not talk to any of the other people present in the lab room. If you have any
questions, I will be on the other side of the room. You can stand up and let me know when your
session is over.”

**The research assistant will take the participant to his or her workstation in the laboratory room
(2532 Wood Hall) and prompt him or her to begin their work session.
**The research assistant observes the participant start their session.

End of Session:
**The research assistant waits until the participant’s 45-minute session is over; the research
assistant will then take the participant back to either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall and remind the
participant when his or her next session is.
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Appendix O
Training Script
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TRAINING SESSION (ALL GROUPS)
After the informed consent form is signed and participants are accepted into the study, the
participant will practice the task for 10 minutes. Take the participant into the lab, and explain the
task to him/her. Point out the various parts of the task as you are explaining them:
“If you have a cell phone, please silence it now and before all sessions. Before you begin the
study, we’d like you to get comfortable with the task, which is designed to simulate the job of a
medical data entry clerk. The computer program will provide you with data corresponding to
patients. You should first look for the “Patient ID number” and type it into the correct location
(the blank “PATIENT ID” box). Then, look at whether the patient is male or female and, based
on the ranges provided for the respective gender, determine whether the patient’s data are
“within range” or “outside of range” by clicking the appropriate button. When you are satisfied
with your response, click the “submit” button to close the current patient’s record and generate
the next record. Let’s try one.”
Have the participant complete a record. Ask if there are any questions about the task. If so,
answer the questions.
“Each computer has access to the Internet, as well as 6 computer games available for play at any
time: Solitaire, Bejeweled, Mahjong, Text Twist, Jewel Quest, and Angry Birds. You are
welcome to play these games, surf the Internet, play with your smart phone, or just take a break
and relax. You may minimize the data entry task but under no circumstances should you close
the program. Closing the program may result in no payment for the session, with an option to
come in again to repeat the session. Additionally, all devices must be muted while in session so
you do not disturb the other research participants.
Today, we’d like you to practice the task for 10 minutes. I will come back after 10 minutes to
turn off the task and schedule your sessions. “
Return after 10 minutes. Record these data on the participant’s spreadsheet. Schedule subsequent
session with the participant in the room used for greeting.
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Appendix P
Covariate Session Script
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Covariate Session for all participants:
Introductory sessions will begin in 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall:
The student investigator or the research assistant will read aloud the paragraphs below at the
beginning of the initial session for each participant:
“For all future sessions, we will meet in this room or the room next door. Remember that before
you go to the experimental room, make sure that any devices you do bring with you to the
experimental room are completely silent in order not to disturb other participants in the study.”
“During this 45-minute session, do your best to correctly complete as many records as you can.
We are assessing your keyboard proficiency on the task, which could affect how you perform the
task in the future. You will be paid $6.00 for this first session. We will pay you, in cash, at the end
of the study for this session and every following session that you attend. The computer program
will automatically stop once 45 minutes have passed and let you know when your session is over.
It is important that you never close the computer program during any of your sessions. In order
for the session to count, the computer program must have the full 45 minutes accounted for.
However, this does not mean you need to work for the entire 45 minutes. You may take a break
whenever you like for as long as you like. As a break, you may play one of the computer games,
access the Internet, or use your cell phone, or you may also just stretch and relax. However, please
be careful not to interrupt or disturb other participants. Remember, it is very important that you
complete as many records as you can. Do you have any questions?”
“There is a job aid for the task located next to the computer just in case you have forgotten how
to complete the task.”

**The research assistant will take the participant to his or her workstation in the laboratory room
(2532 Wood Hall), open the program on the computer, and prompt him or her to begin their
work session.
**The research assistant observes the participant start their session.

End of Covariate Session:
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**The research assistant waits until the participant’s 45-minute session is over; the research
assistant will then take the participant back to either 2510 or 2512 Wood Hall and remind the
participant when his or her next session is.
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Appendix Q
Incentive Pay System Training
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“Before we get started today, I want to tell you how you will be paid for all of your remaining
sessions. Once I have done so, I would like to make sure that you understand how you will be
paid by giving you a short quiz. You must score 100% in order to pass, but you can take multiple
versions of the test until you achieve that. If you don’t score 100% on your first time, I will go
over the items you missed and explain to you why you missed them, after which you can take
another version of the same test. Do you have any questions?” [Answer any questions.]
“Today and for the rest of your sessions, you will be paid two cents for each medical record
entry that you correctly complete. Thus, your pay is based on your performance. For instance, if
you were to correctly complete 400 records today session, you would earn $8.00. But notice that
you are not being paid for records completed, but for correctly completed records. If you were to
complete 400 records today, but only 350 of them were correctly completed, then you would
earn $7.00. “
“Do you have any questions regarding how you will be paid? [Answer any questions.] Great,
let’s have you take the quiz, now.”

Once the participant scores 100% on the quiz, ask if he or she has any questions and
proceed to read the experimental session script
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Incentive Pay System Training Quiz #1
Participants are allowed to use a calculator or calculator app on their cellphone during the quiz.
PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid 2 cents for every medical data record correctly processed during the session.
Answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 200 medical records during a session. How much money did
James earn for that session?

2. Michelle processed 367 medical records during a session. 333 were correct. How much
money did Michelle earn for that session?

3. Steve correctly processed 522 medical records during a session. How much money did
Steve earn for that session?
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Incentive Pay System Training Quiz #2
Participants are allowed to use a calculator or calculator app on their cellphone during the quiz.
PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid 2 cents for every medical data record correctly processed during the session.
Answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Dale correctly processed 534 medical records during a session. How much money did Dale
earn for that session?

2.Miles processed 425 medical records during a session. 377 were correct. How much money
did Miles earn for that session?

3.Jessica correctly processed 284 medical records during a session. How much money did
Jessica earn for that session?
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Appendix R
Debriefing Scripts
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Goal-Setting with Fixed Pay
Debriefing Session Script:
**This script will be read aloud by the student investigator or a research assistant to each
participant following the completion of the study.
Thank you for your participation in this study. As one last task, I would like to ask you to fill out
this short survey about your experiences as a participant in the study. Is that something you are
willing to do?”
**The research assistant will give the participant the survey.
“Thank you for completing the survey!”
“Thank you again for your participation in the study. The reason for this session is so that I can
provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the study that you have just completed. Feel free to
ask any questions you have.
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the effects of goal-setting and social comparison
feedback on performance under hourly and incentive pay. You were in a condition in which you
received hourly pay and goal-setting. There were (18-22) other people in your group who also
received hourly pay and goal-setting”.
There were three other conditions, one in which participants received incentive pay and goalsetting, second in which participants received hourly pay and social comparison feedback, and
third condition in which participants received incentive pay and social comparison feedback.
Social comparison feedback is when participants received a graph of their individual performance
and the individual performances of other group members (show the sample SCF – individual
performance for each individual graph).
We will be comparing the performance of individuals in these four groups.”
**The research assistant will have a time sheet available that will be provided by the
student investigator.
“I will now pay you for your participation. You completed four sessions during the study. You
earned $6.00 for each session, thus you earned a total of $24 (experimenter pays the participant).
Do you have any questions or concerns about this study or your participation at this time?
Thank you for your participation in this study and please do not discuss this study with anyone
else because we are still in the process of debriefing other participants.
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Goal-Setting with Incentive Pay
Debriefing Session Script:
**This script will be read aloud by the student investigator or a research assistant to each
participant following the completion of the study.
Thank you for your participation in this study. As one last task, I would like to ask you to fill out
this short survey about your experiences as a participant in the study. Is that something you are
willing to do?”
**The research assistant will give the participant the survey.
“Thank you for completing the survey!”
“Thank you again for your participation in the study. The reason for this session is so that I can
provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the study that you have just completed. Feel free to
ask any questions you have.
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the effects of goal-setting and social comparison
feedback on performance under hourly and incentive pay. You were in a condition in which you
received incentive pay and goal-setting. There were (18-22) other people in your group who also
received incentive pay and goal-setting”.
There were three other conditions, one in which participants received hourly pay and goal-setting,
second in which participants received hourly pay and social comparison feedback, and third
condition in which participants received incentive pay and social comparison feedback. Social
comparison feedback is when participants received a graph of their individual performance and
the individual performances of other group members (show the sample SCF – individual
performance for each individual graph).
We will be comparing the performance of individuals in these four groups.”
**The research assistant will have a time sheet available that will be provided by the
student investigator.
“I will now pay you for your participation. You completed four sessions during the study. Here’s
the number of medical records you correctly completed in each session along with the total number
(show and give them the receipt). Each correctly completed record was worth 2 cents, thus you
earned a total of X (experimenter pays the participant).
Do you have any questions or concerns about this study or your participation at this time?
Thank you for your participation in this study and please do not discuss this study with anyone
else because we are still in the process of debriefing other participants.
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Social Comparison Feedback with Incentive Pay- Debriefing Session Script:
**This script will be read aloud by the student investigator or a research assistant to each
participant following the completion of the study.
Thank you for your participation in this study. As one last task, I would like to ask you to fill out
this short survey about your experiences as a participant in the study. Is that something you are
willing to do?”
**The research assistant will give the participant the survey.
“Thank you for completing the survey!”
“Thank you again for your participation in the study. The reason for this session is so that I can
provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the study that you have just completed. Feel free to
ask any questions you have.
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the effects of goal-setting and social comparison
feedback on performance under hourly and incentive pay. You were in a condition in which you
received incentive pay and social comparison feedback. There were actually (18-22) other people
in your group who also received incentive pay and social comparison feedback”.
There were three other conditions, one in which participants received hourly pay and social
comparison feedback, second in which participants received hourly pay and goal-setting, and third
condition in which participants received incentive pay and goal-setting. Goal-setting feedback was
when participants received a graph showing them their performance and then 5 goals to aim for
(show the sample goal-setting graph).
We will be comparing the performance of individuals in these four groups.”
**The research assistant will have a time sheet available that will be provided by the
student investigator.
“I will now pay you for your participation. You completed four sessions during the study. Here’s
the number of medical records you correctly completed in each session along with the total number
(show and give them the receipt). Each correctly completed record was worth 2 cents, thus you
earned a total of X (experimenter pays the participant).
Do you have any questions or concerns about this study or your participation at this time?
Thank you for your participation in this study and please do not discuss this study with anyone
else because we are still in the process of debriefing other participants.
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Social Comparison Feedback with Fixed Pay- Debriefing Session Script:
**This script will be read aloud by the student investigator or a research assistant to each
participant following the completion of the study.
Thank you for your participation in this study. As one last task, I would like to ask you to fill out
this short survey about your experiences as a participant in the study. Is that something you are
willing to do?”
**The research assistant will give the participant the survey.
“Thank you for completing the survey!”
“Thank you again for your participation in the study. The reason for this session is so that I can
provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the study that you have just completed. Feel free to
ask any questions you have.
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the effects of goal-setting and social comparison
feedback on performance under hourly and incentive pay. You were in a condition in which you
received hourly pay and social comparison feedback. There were actually (18-22) other people in
your group who also received hourly pay and social comparison feedback”.
There were three other conditions, one in which participants received incentive pay and social
comparison feedback, second in which participants received hourly pay and goal-setting, and third
condition in which participants received incentive pay and goal-setting. Goal-setting feedback was
when participants received a graph showing them their performance and then 5 goals to aim for
(show the sample goal-setting graph).
We will be comparing the performance of individuals in these four groups.”
**The research assistant will have a time sheet available that will be provided by the
student investigator.
“I will now pay you for your participation. You completed four sessions during the study. You
earned $6.00 for each session, thus you earned a total of $24 (experimenter pays the participant).
Do you have any questions or concerns about this study or your participation at this time?
Thank you for your participation in this study and please do not discuss this study with anyone
else because we are still in the process of debriefing other participants.
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Appendix S
Receipt for Compensation
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Compensation for Study Participation:
Date: __________
Participant number: _______________________
Number of correct medical records:
1st session:_________
2nd session:________
3rd session:_________
4th session:_________
Total Records:______
Total Payment:_____
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Appendix T
Secondary Results Analyses for All Participants
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Secondary Analysis for All Participants
Table 17 displays the means and standard deviations for the secondary dependent
variables, the three factors that could have affected the primary dependent variable (correctly
completed records).
Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations for Accuracy, Rate, and Time on Task – All Participants

Accuracy
Condition

n

Goal-Setting and Fixed Pay

Mean

SD

Rate

Time on Task

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

20 96.25% 3.69%

6.08

1.29

41.97

5.02

Social Comparison Feedback and
Fixed Pay

22 94.73% 7.17%

6.21

1.77

41.96

5.62

Goal-Setting and Incentive Pay

19 96.20% 5.13%

6.24

1.65

40.40

5.84

Social Comparison Feedback and
Incentive Pay

20 96.75% 2.86%

6.91

1.65

43.38

2.74

The relationships between the primary dependent variable and the secondary dependent
variables were calculated using Pearson product moment correlations and the results are shown
in Table 18. All correlations were significant, aside from the correlation between time on task
and accuracy. There was a close to perfect positive correlation between correctly completed
medical records and rate.
Questionnaire Analysis for All Participants
Eighty participants answered the post-study questionnaire. All questions used a Likert
scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Participants in all conditions answered
four questions related to stress, motivation, and satisfaction. Table 19 shows the means and
standard deviations for each of the four questions. Tables 20, 21, 22, and 23 display information
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from the subsequent ANOVAs that were conducted to determine whether differences existed
between the groups means. No significant difference was detected between the conditions for
any of the four questions.
An extra question was included on the questionnaire for the SCF conditions to measure
whether participants were uncomfortable having other people see their performance. As before,
this question used a Likert scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. In the fixed
pay condition, the mean rating for the question “I was uncomfortable having other people in my
group see my performance” was 1.64 (SD = .95). The mean rating for the incentive condition
was 1.63 (SD = 1.07). The mean ratings suggest that participants were not uncomfortable with
other people being able to see how well they were performing. Table 24 displays the information
from ANOVA that was conducted to see if there was a difference between the two conditions.
No significant difference was detected.
Table 18
Correlations between the Primary and Secondary Dependent Variables – All Participants

Correctly Completed Medical Records
Time on Task
Rate
*p < 0.01

Time on Task
.65*

Rate
.96*
.43*

Accuracy
.30*
.09
.36*
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Table 19
Means and Standard Deviations for Stress, Motivation, and Satisfaction Questions – All
Participants
“I was stressed
or anxious
when
performing the
task”
Mean
SD

“I did my
best every
session”

“I tried to
improve my
performance
from session to
session”
Mean
SD

Mean

SD

1.17

4.15

.67

4.45

1.82

.91

3.77

1.31

18

1.83

.92

3.89

Social
Comparison
Feedback and
Incentive Pay

20

1.90

.85

Overall

80

1.81

.97

Condition

n

Goal-Setting
and Fixed Pay

20

1.70

Social
Comparison
Feedback and
Fixed Pay

22

Goal-Setting
and Incentive
Pay

“I was
satisfied
with the pay
system”
Mean

SD

.69

4.90

.31

4.46

.80

4.68

.57

.76

4.44

.78

4.61

.61

4.21

.92

4.65

.59

4.40

.94

4.00

.96

4.50

.72

4.65

.65

Table 20
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Stressed or Anxious When Performing the Task” – All
Participants
df
Source
SS MS F
p
Treatment 3
.41 .14 .15 .932
Error
76 71.77 .94
Total
79 72.19
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Table 21
ANOVA Source Table for “I Did My Best Every Session” – All Participants
df
Source
SS MS F
p
Treatment 3 2.65 .88 .96 .418
Error
75 69.35 .92
Total
78 72.00
Table 22
ANOVA Source Table for “I Tried to Improve My Performance from Session to Session” – All
Participants
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3
.60
Error
76 39.40
Total
79 40.00

MS

F

p

.20 .39 .763
.52

Table 23
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Satisfied with the Pay System” – All Participants
Source

df

SS

Treatment 3 2.55
Error
76 31.65
Total
79 34.20

MS

F

p

.85 2.04 .115
.42

Table 24
ANOVA Source Table for “I was Uncomfortable Having Other People in My Group See My
Performance” – All Participants
Source

df

SS

MS

F

p

Treatment 1 .0002 .0002 .00 .988
Error
39 39.51 1.01
Total
40 39.51

